The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation by Staszewski, Glen
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
2015
The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation
Glen Staszewski
Michigan State University College of Law, staszew2@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B. U. L. Rev. 209 (2015).
 209 
THE DUMBING DOWN OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
GLEN STASZEWSKI∗ 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 210 
 I. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TREND ........................................................ 215 
A. Codified Rules of Statutory Interpretation .................................. 216 
B. Methodological Stare Decisis ...................................................... 217 
C. Lower Standards for Lower Courts ............................................. 219 
D. No Frills Textualism .................................................................... 222 
E. Reading Law ................................................................................ 224 
F. Interpretive Regimes .................................................................... 225 
 II. DRIVERS OF THE TREND ...................................................................... 226 
A. The Perceived Need to Constrain Judicial Discretion ................ 226 
B. The Perceived Need for Clarity and Predictability ..................... 228 
C. The Traditional Legal Sources of Interpretive 
Methodology ................................................................................ 230 
D. Interpretation As Constructed Meaning ...................................... 234 
 III. REEVALUATING THE ASSUMPTIONS .................................................... 236 
A. The Importance of Avoiding Domination .................................... 237 
B. The Value of Practical Reasoning and Diversity ........................ 242 
C. The Modern Legal Hierarchy in the Regulatory State ................ 249 
 1.  The Descriptive Hypothesis.................................................. 251 
 2.  The Normative Thesis .......................................................... 253 
 3.  Autonomous Versus Responsive Law .................................. 256 
D. Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy ................................. 261 
 IV. REJECTING THE TREND ........................................................................ 262 
A. Interpretive Guidance .................................................................. 263 
B. Methodological Considerations .................................................. 267 
 
∗ Professor of Law & The A.J. Thomas Faculty Scholar, Michigan State University 
College of Law. I received thoughtful comments and suggestions on this project during 
faculty workshops at Florida International University College of Law, Michigan State 
University College of Law, the University of Richmond School of Law, and at the 2013 
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. I am especially grateful for insightful 
comments on earlier drafts from Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Evan Criddle, Corinna Lain, and 
Kristen Osenga, and for research assistance from Ben Curl. Finally, I am thankful for the 
comments that Evan Criddle and I received on a related essay from Aaron Bruhl, Neal 
Devins, Bill Eskridge, Abbe Gluck, Ali Larsen, Chad Oldfather, and Michael 
Sant’Ambrogio, which also proved extremely valuable in this Article’s development. 
 
  
210 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:209 
 
C. Percolation in the Lower Courts ................................................. 270 
D. The Fatal Flaws of the New Textualisms ..................................... 276 
E. Institutional Dialogues ................................................................ 277 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 278 
 
This Article criticizes a recent movement toward making statutory 
interpretation simpler and more uniform. The trend is reflected by proposals to 
adopt codified rules of statutory interpretation, give stare decisis effect to 
interpretive methodology, use simpler methods of statutory interpretation in 
lower courts, and implement certain versions of textualism. This Article 
explains that such proposals are driven by an overarching desire to limit 
judicial discretion and promote a formal vision of the rule of law; they assume 
that the traditional hierarchy of legal sources is exclusive, and that statutory 
interpretation’s function is to ascertain the meaning of the law. 
This Article challenges each of these goals or assumptions by claiming, first, 
that instead of seeking to eliminate judicial discretion, the primary goal of 
statutory interpretation methodology should be to protect the people from the 
possibility of domination by the state. Second, the resolution of disputes 
regarding the permissible scope of governmental authority in difficult statutory 
cases requires the use of practical reasoning, and the quality of statutory law 
and its democratic legitimacy benefit from a broad range of arguments and 
diverse judicial perspectives. Third, the traditional hierarchy of legal sources 
is outdated, and “interpretive methodology” and “agency decision-making” 
should be viewed as distinct forms of law that merit their own special places in 
a new legal hierarchy for the regulatory state. Finally, the central function of 
statutory interpretation by federal courts in the modern regulatory state is to 
provide individuals and groups with opportunities to contest the validity of 
particular exercises of governmental authority, rather than to ascertain the 
meaning of the law in a vacuum. This Article therefore argues that the recent 
proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation are fundamentally misguided, 
and it closes by making several related observations about the extent to which 
interpretive methodology can or should be simple or uniform. In sum, 
provisional dialogues by and among different centers of power better reflect 
the nature of law in the modern regulatory state than artificial efforts to 
achieve simple, predictable, or uniform final answers to our most pressing 
legal or social problems. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1980s, a prominent legal scholar observed that “[t]he general 
contemporary American view of statutory interpretation is that there is not a 
great deal to say about the subject. As a result, nothing else as important in the 
law receives so little attention.”1 There has been a dramatic revival of interest 
 
1 Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983), quoted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION 
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in the topic since that time,2 which has focused primarily on how federal courts 
should interpret statutes in a representative democracy with separated powers.3 
The academic literature and accompanying judicial debates have resulted in the 
development of dynamic theories of statutory interpretation,4 the rise (and 
alleged fall) of the new textualism,5 the alleged emergence of a new 
purposivism,6 and, finally, calls to end the “interpretation wars” that have 
raged for the past quarter century with the declaration of a “truce.”7 One 
influential new voice in the field has pointed out that “the kinds of questions” 
raised by the interpretation wars “are continually debated, but never 
definitively resolved, in modern Supreme Court statutory interpretation.”8 In 
her view, “[t]hese debates are no longer useful,” and the failure to settle on a 
consistent and predictable approach to statutory interpretation “wastes court 
and litigant resources; deprives Congress of an incentive to coordinate its 
behavior with the Court’s interpretive methods; retains rather than eliminates 
another source of intracourt disagreement; and makes the Court appear result-
oriented, because the governing principles change from case to case.”9 The 
chief problem, from this perspective, is simply that “American courts have no 
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory 
interpretation.”10 
A number of scholars have sought to remedy this problem by developing 
proposals to simplify statutory interpretation and render interpretive 
methodology more consistent and predictable. Thus, for example, leading 
scholars have recently advocated the adoption of Federal Rules of Statutory 
 
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1 (2d ed. 2006).  
2 See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).  
3 See Glen Staszewski, Introduction to Symposium on Administrative Statutory 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.  
4 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479 (1987); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 20 (1988) (proposing a “nautical,” as opposed to an “archaeological” approach to 
statutory interpretation, which would focus courts on guiding statutes forward instead of 
uncovering past meaning).  
5 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); 
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006).  
6 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113.  
7 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
117, 119 (2009) (“The latest move in the interpretation wars . . . is to declare something of a 
truce.”); see Molot, supra note 5, at 59-69 (advocating the dawn of a “posttextualist era”).  
8 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1766 (2010).  
9 Id. at 1767.  
10 HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994), quoted in ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.  
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Interpretation;11 argued that judicial decisions regarding interpretive 
methodology should be given stare decisis effect;12 suggested different (and 
presumably simplified) approaches to statutory interpretation for lower 
courts;13 developed a provocative new theory of “no frills textualism;”14 
published a major new treatise on the proper textualist method of “reading 
law;”15 and recognized the virtues of establishing an “interpretive regime” that 
would allow Congress to draft statutes with greater knowledge of how its work 
will subsequently be interpreted.16 The explicit premise of much of this work is 
that “often it is not as important to choose the best convention as it is to choose 
one convention, and stick to it.”17 I refer to this trend toward simplification and 
uniformity as “the dumbing down of statutory interpretation.”18 
 
11 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085 (2002); see also Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory 
Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333 (2004) (advocating the creation of a 
restatement of statutory interpretation based on the ALI model); but see Lawrence M. Solan, 
Is It Time for a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation?, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 733 (2014) 
(expressing skepticism regarding this proposal). 
12 See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011); 
Gluck, supra note 8; Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The 
Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (2008). 
13 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in 
a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012). 
14 William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2044 (2006) 
(reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)) (describing 
Vermeule’s theory of statutory interpretation); see VERMEULE, supra.  
15 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
16 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of 
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI 265, 267-70 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law As 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994). 
17 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 67, quoted in Foster, supra note 12, at 1888; see 
Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2088 & n.9 (quoting Eskridge and Frickey and claiming that 
“a central imperative of statutory interpretation” is “a single, predictable, coherent set of 
rules”); see also Gluck, supra note 8, at 1848-49 (recognizing that a premise of her work is 
that “settling on a consistent approach is a worthy goal for statutory interpreters,” and 
claiming that “the benefits of a consistently applied, ex ante-announced interpretive 
methodology might outweigh the costs of loss of flexibility”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“There are times when even a 
bad rule is better than no rule at all.”); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 74, 140 (2000) (“It is more important that judges select one answer and apply it 
consistently over time than that they select the right answer.”). 
18 In order to avoid any potential misunderstanding, I want to be entirely clear that I am 
most certainly not referring to the advocates of these proposals as “dumb.” Nor am I 
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This Article argues that the dumbing down of statutory interpretation is 
fundamentally misguided, and that the recent calls for simplification and 
uniformity should be rejected. After describing the foregoing proposals in 
greater detail,19 this Article identifies the common goals or assumptions that 
appear to be driving recent calls for reform.20 First, the advocates of such 
proposals are seeking to limit and constrain judicial discretion in the service of 
widespread visions of legislative supremacy and democratic legitimacy. 
Second, they are trying to demand greater clarity and predictability in 
interpretive methodology to promote “the rule of law as a law of rules.”21 
Third, the advocates of such reforms generally assume that interpretive 
methodology is a form of “law,” and they rely on the traditional hierarchy of 
legal sources (namely, the Constitution, statutes, and common law) for the 
proposition that interpretive methodology must either be constitutional law or 
common law. Accordingly, they either contend that their proposals are 
constitutionally mandated22 or that interpretive methodology is judicially 
created common law that could be overridden by statute,23 and should, in any 
event, be treated as binding precedent or explicitly overruled.24 Finally, the 
advocates of such proposals reflexively assume that statutory interpretation’s 
function is to ascertain the meaning of the law. The judiciary necessarily 
performs this function by selecting and applying available interpretive rules. If 
courts were to follow (and, better yet, if they were required to follow) a 
consistent and uniform set of interpretive rules, we could simplify the 
interpretive process, minimize judicial discretion, and improve the clarity and 
predictability of legal meaning. It is, thus, easy to see why so many scholars 
and judges would jump on this bandwagon.25 
 
accusing them of “dumbing down” the scholarly literature on statutory interpretation. On the 
contrary, this is some of the most sophisticated, thoughtful, and impressive work in the field, 
and it has greatly enlivened the discourse on statutory interpretation and generated important 
new lines of inquiry. My claim is merely that if these proposals were adopted, the intended 
effect would be to “dumb down” the practice of statutory interpretation in the courts. I 
argue that this would be an unfortunate result for the reasons developed in the Article.  
19 See infra Part I.  
20 See infra Part II.  
21 See Scalia, supra note 17. 
22 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 23-24; see also John F. Manning, Textualism 
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (claiming that the American 
constitutional structure compels central aspects of textualism).  
23 See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2156 (“[T]he judicial power over this area may, like 
any other federal common lawmaking power, be trumped by Congress.”).  
24 See generally Foster, supra note 12; Gluck, supra note 12.  
25 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679 (1999) (“Few would object to the overall goal of 
making the law more predictable, objective, and so forth.”).  
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This Article aims to dampen this enthusiasm by reevaluating each of the 
preceding goals or assumptions.26 First, it claims that instead of seeking to 
eliminate judicial discretion, the primary goal of statutory interpretation 
methodology should be to protect the people from the possibility of arbitrary 
domination by the state.27 While this vision of statutory interpretation respects 
the principle of legislative supremacy,28 it also promotes an understanding of 
freedom and democracy that is more robust and attainable than the competing 
views underlying the traditional faithful agent models.29 Second, this Article 
recognizes that the advantages of rule-based decision-making should be 
respected. It claims, however, that the resolution of disputes regarding the 
permissible scope of governmental authority in difficult statutory cases 
requires the use of practical reasoning,30 and that the quality of statutory law 
and its democratic legitimacy substantially benefit from a broad range of 
arguments and diverse judicial perspectives.31 Third, this Article suggests that 
the traditional hierarchy of legal sources is outdated in the modern regulatory 
state, and proposes that “interpretive methodology” and “agency decision-
making” are distinct forms of law that merit their own special places in the 
following new legal hierarchy: (1) Constitution, (2) interpretive methodology, 
(3) statutes, (4) agency action, (5) common law. Moreover, unlike traditional 
sources of law, which are traditionally viewed as fixed, these “new” forms of 
law are, by definition, provisional. From this perspective, Congress cannot 
dictate binding rules of statutory interpretation to the judiciary, and one court 
cannot ordinarily dictate the interpretive methodology of its successors. 
Finally, this Article claims that the central function of statutory interpretation 
by federal courts in the modern regulatory state is to provide individuals and 
groups with opportunities to contest the validity of particular exercises of 
governmental authority.32 If courts were to follow (or, worse yet, if they were 
required to follow) a consistent and uniform set of interpretive rules, statutory 
interpretation could no longer perform its central function in the modern 
 
26 See infra Part III.  
27 See Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 221, 245-49 (2013).  
28 See id. at 249, 252-53, 258. 
29 For a political theoretical account of this understanding of freedom and democracy, 
see PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 177-78 
(1997), and Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 164-83 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cardón eds., 1999). 
30 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). 
31 See Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory 
Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-
costs-of-consensus-in-statutory-construction, archived at http://perma.cc/89S6-GRY6 
(“Dissensus creates a system of open deliberation that has a significant impact on our legal 
system and creates tangible benefits.”). 
32 See Staszewski, supra note 27. 
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regulatory state, and the people would be subject to potential domination in 
ways that would severely undermine democracy. 
After setting forth these contrasting views of statutory interpretation, this 
Article returns to the recent proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation 
and provides the following observations. First, while Congress is certainly free 
to provide the federal judiciary with interpretive guidance, the vast majority of 
codified rules of statutory interpretation cannot bind the courts. Second, while 
the federal judiciary should treat prior methodological decisions with an 
appropriate degree of respect, those prior decisions will only provide non-
binding, methodological considerations in future cases. Third, the nature of the 
interpretive arguments that can be presented by parties and relied upon by 
lower courts should not be artificially restricted. The resource constraints on 
lower federal courts are likely overstated in this context, and limits on their 
decision-making competence are better resolved by allowing statutory issues to 
percolate within the federal judicial system than by attempting to restrict 
access to relevant and potentially persuasive information. Fourth, textualism’s 
dogmatic focus on ascertaining “what the law as enacted meant”33 is 
fundamentally misguided because it eliminates the contestatory dimension of 
statutory interpretation. This problem is significantly compounded when courts 
purport to rely on artificial decision-making frameworks34 or refuse to conduct 
meaningful review of administrative action.35 Finally, there is already an 
“interpretive regime” that provides sufficient guidance to Congress regarding 
how its work is likely to be interpreted. The contrary position is based on an 
outdated and deeply erroneous view of the nature of law and the function of 
statutory interpretation. In sum, provisional dialogues by and among different 
centers of power better reflect the nature of law in the modern regulatory state 
than artificial efforts to achieve simple, predictable, and uniform final answers 
to our most pressing legal or social problems. 
I. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TREND 
 The trend that is the focus of this Article is reflected by a variety of recent 
intellectual movements and scholarly proposals. The main unifying principle is 
a belief that statutory interpretation methodology is currently too complicated, 
inconsistent, and unpredictable. This is largely the case because the 
methodology that is used by federal courts to interpret statutes is generally not 
treated as a traditional form of “law,” and judges are therefore permitted to use 
whatever interpretive methodology they prefer to resolve each particular 
case.36 For example, a judge may examine the legislative history of a statute in 
 
33 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara City, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 671 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
34 Cf. Gluck, supra note 8, at 1771-1811 (providing examples of states that have adopted 
“controlling interpretive frameworks”).  
35 See VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 183 (advocating strong deference to agencies).  
36 This description of the current situation and the following example are borrowed from 
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case A, but decline to do so in case B. Similarly, a judge could utilize a 
textualist methodology in case X, an intentionalist methodology in case Y, and 
a purposive or dynamic approach in case Z. The proposals to dumb down 
statutory interpretation view this as an unacceptable (indeed, lawless) state of 
affairs, and they seek to impose simplicity and uniformity on the enterprise. 
This Part describes the most significant manifestations of the trend, while the 
following Part explains the ideas and values that are driving it. 
A. Codified Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
The most obvious manifestation of the trend toward simplicity and 
uniformity in statutory interpretation is Nicholas Rosenkranz’s proposal to 
enact “Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation.”37 Rosenkranz points out that 
theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation “have become elaborate and 
sophisticated,” and that “the very richness of this intellectual landscape has 
resulted in unpredictability and confusion.”38 This is highly problematic, from 
his perspective, because “[t]he most important features of an interpretive 
regime are that it be clear, predictable, and internally coherent, and that both 
promulgator and interpreter of text agree on the regime beforehand.”39 Indeed, 
Rosenkranz contends that “[i]n most cases, the particular choice of rule will be 
less important than that some clear rule be chosen.”40 Rosenkranz points out 
that Congress could, in theory, promulgate a statute that adopts legally binding 
rules of statutory interpretation.41 He claims that most of the potential rules 
would be constitutionally permissible,42 and that the enactment of such a code 
would be good public policy.43 While his discussion of the ideal content of the 
rules is quite limited, Rosenkranz does recommend the selection of an official 
dictionary for statutory interpretation, the codification of a slate of preferred 
canons, and a clear decision (one way or the other) on whether the use of 
legislative history is permissible.44 To illustrate the broad range of available 
 
my recent essay on a related topic with Evan Criddle. See Evan J. Criddle & Glen 
Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1576 (2014). 
37 See Rosenkranz, supra note 11. 
38 Id. at 2086.  
39 Id. at 2157.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 2156. For a non-binding variation on this proposal, see O’Connor, supra note 11, 
at 334 (recommending “that the American Law Institute (ALI) promulgate a ‘Restatement 
of Statutory Interpretation’”). 
42 Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2092-2140. 
43 Id. at 2151-53. Rosenkranz recommends adopting the rules through the same process 
as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. For a brief description of this 
procedure, see Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of 
Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1198-1202 
(2012). 
44 Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2147-51.  
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options, he also suggests that the rules could require federal courts to interpret 
statutes in a textualist fashion and eliminate horizontal stare decisis in statutory 
cases.45 
The idea of a legislature adopting codified rules of statutory interpretation is 
not hypothetical. As Rosenkranz points out, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted some version of an interpretative code.46 Moreover, 
several foreign nations have adopted interpretive codes.47 Finally, Congress 
has enacted the Dictionary Act,48 which provides presumptive definitions of 
various terms that are used throughout the United States Code, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 199149 explicitly limits the material that can be used as 
legislative history in interpreting the statute.50 Rosenkranz builds on these 
precedents to advocate the adoption of one coherent and comprehensive set of 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation. 
B. Methodological Stare Decisis 
Another way to simplify statutory interpretation, and render interpretive 
methodology more consistent and predictable, would be to persuade the federal 
judiciary to give stare decisis effect to its methodological decisions.51 The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized in the substantive-law context that 
“[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.”52 Justice Brandeis famously embraced this policy “because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
 
45 Id. at 2124-26. These suggestions have been adopted pursuant to adjudication by the 
Michigan Supreme Court. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 1803-11.  
46 Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2089-90 & n.10, 2132; see also Jacob Scott, Codified 
Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010); Alan R. Romero, 
Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. LEGIS. 211 (1994).  
47 Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2089 & n.11 (listing foreign statutory interpretation 
codes); see Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA & 15AB (Austl.); see also D.C. 
PEARCE & R.S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA 24-30, 63 (5th ed. 
2001) (discussing codified methodology in Australia); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in 
Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479, 525, 534 (2013) (discussing this example).  
48 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); see Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2110 (implying that while 
the Dictionary Act is broad in scope, it is still “trivial”).  
49 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). 
50 Id. at note (“No statements other than the interpretive memorandum . . . shall be 
considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in 
construing or applying . . . [certain provisions] of this Act . . . .”), quoted in Rosenkranz, 
supra note 11, at 2109.  
51 For a detailed discussion and critique of such proposals, see Criddle & Staszewski, 
supra note 36. 
52 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).  
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than that it be settled right.”53 Stare decisis requires the Supreme Court to 
follow its own precedents in the absence of a “special justification,” and it also 
requires lower courts to adhere strictly to the prior decisions of higher courts.54 
Moreover, the conventional wisdom is that prior interpretations of statutes by 
federal courts are entitled to “super-strong” stare decisis effect, partly because 
Congress could amend a statute to override an erroneous or outdated judicial 
decision.55 Notwithstanding widespread support for the doctrine of stare 
decisis on substantive statutory issues, however, federal courts generally do 
not give stare decisis effect to their methodological decisions in statutory 
interpretation cases.56  
Several scholars have recently recognized that “the doctrine of stare decisis 
is tailor-made” to provide the consistency and predictability “that are 
notoriously lacking in statutory interpretation doctrine,” and they have argued 
that federal courts should give stare decisis effect to their decisions regarding 
interpretive methodology.57 Thus, Sydney Foster has argued not only that this 
course of action would provide the same benefits that are provided by the 
application of stare decisis to substantive decisions, but that giving stare 
decisis effect to interpretive methodology would serve a valuable coordinating 
function that is largely unnecessary in the substantive-law context.58 
Accordingly, Foster claims that courts should give even stronger stare decisis 
effect to interpretive methodology than is provided to substantive decisions.59 
Similarly, Abbe Gluck argues that “settling on a consistent approach is a 
worthy goal for statutory interpreters.”60 Based on her examination of the 
experiences of several states,61 Gluck contends that “judges can and do bind 
other judges’ methodological choices, in the same way they bind one another 
 
53 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
54 Foster, supra note 12, at 1864 n.3.  
55 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 
1362 (1988).  
56 See Foster, supra note 12, at 1866, 1872-84; Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime 
Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1974-81 (2005); Gluck, supra note 8, at 1765; Jonathan 
R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 339, 385-86 (2005). 
57 Foster, supra note 12, at 1866. 
58 Id. at 1886-97.  
59 Id. at 1867-69; see also Connors, supra note 12, at 683 (arguing that “extending stare 
decisis to statutory interpretation subdecisions might enhance” communication between the 
judicial and legislative branches). 
60 Gluck, supra note 8, at 1848; see also id. at 1846-61 (offering a normative defense of 
consistent approaches to statutory interpretation more generally).  
61 Id. at 1771-1811 (providing case studies of several states that have adopted 
“controlling interpretive frameworks” and that have given their methodological decisions 
stare decisis effect).  
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with respect to substantive preferences.”62 Both Foster and Gluck point out that 
the judiciary gives stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology in various 
other legal contexts, and they suggest that rules of statutory interpretation 
should not be treated any differently.63 Indeed, Gluck claims that interpretive 
methodology is given stare decisis effect when federal courts review the 
legality of agency decision-making under Chevron and its progeny;64 and there 
is also precedent for treating interpretive methodology as precedent in other 
countries.65 Foster and Gluck therefore advocate the development of a 
relatively uniform and predictable set of interpretive rules for federal courts,66 
which could be established by giving stare decisis effect to methodological 
decisions in statutory interpretation. 
C. Lower Standards for Lower Courts 
The advocates of the foregoing proposals appear to expect that they would 
be creating a uniform and predictable set of interpretive rules that would be 
binding on all federal courts. The Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
would therefore presumably apply in the Supreme Court as well as in the lower 
 
62 Id. at 1823.  
63 See Foster, supra note 12, at 1900-01 (“[T]he law sometimes does impose constraints 
on ‘how judges think,’ directing them on questions of contract interpretation, weighing 
evidence when making factual determinations, and implementing constitutional 
provisions.”); Gluck, supra note 12, at 1968 (“[M]any of these other interpretive regimes—
including rules of contract and trust interpretation, choice of law, and even some 
constitutional law regimes—share key characteristics with the rules of statutory 
interpretation.”).  
64 Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the 
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 798-801 (2013). But cf. Connor N. Raso & 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of 
What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1727 
(2010) (examining the Supreme Court’s deference doctrine since Chevron and finding that 
“the Justices generally do not give deference-regime precedents anything close to stare 
decisis effect”). 
65 See, e.g., James J. Brudney, The Story of Pepper v. Hart: Examining Legislative 
History Across the Pond, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 258-94 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011) (describing legislative history’s treatment in Britain and 
making comparisons with the United States). 
66 While Foster would accord “extra-strong” precedential weight to methodological 
decisions in statutory interpretation, Foster, supra note 12, at 1868, Gluck suggests that 
methodological decisions “might occupy a place on that spectrum of law, perhaps meriting 
lower precedential weight in order to give judges the ability to evolve interpretive doctrine 
over time and respond to changes in the legislative process . . . .” Gluck, supra note 12, at 
1917-18. Gluck has more recently suggested that interpretive doctrine might be “tailored” so 
that different approaches would apply to different statutes or different areas of law. See Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 725, 797-800 (2014). 
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federal courts, and the normal rules of horizontal and vertical stare decisis 
would presumably extend to methodological decisions in statutory 
interpretation. Aaron Bruhl has recently argued, however, that “[s]tatutory 
interpretation is a court-specific activity that should differ according to the 
institutional circumstances of the interpreting court,” and “[t]he U.S. Supreme 
Court is not the model all other courts should emulate.”67 
Bruhl identifies three types of institutional differences among courts that 
may counsel in favor of distinct interpretive methodologies. First, he suggests 
that a court’s place in the judicial hierarchy could properly influence how it 
approaches statutory interpretation.68 For example, some theories and doctrines 
of statutory interpretation are predicated upon the legislature’s ability to amend 
a statute in response to the judiciary’s decision.69 Yet Bruhl points out that 
Congress is typically much more likely to learn about a Supreme Court 
decision on a particular topic than a decision by a federal district court.70 
Accordingly, theories and doctrines that depend upon anticipated legislative 
responses may be more appropriate for the Supreme Court (and higher state 
courts71) than for lower federal courts.72 Second, Bruhl points out that “[t]he 
Supreme Court decides relatively few cases, and each one is the product of 
massive investment of public and private time and effort,”73 whereas lower 
courts “decide many, many more cases, and they do so with smaller staffs,” 
weaker or more variable briefing, fewer amicus briefs, and little or no 
opportunity for collaboration with colleagues.74 He claims that these resource 
disparities could properly lead lower courts to use interpretive methodologies 
that differ in some respects from those of the Supreme Court.75 Finally, Bruhl 
argues that differences in judicial selection could potentially justify differences 
in interpretive methodology.76 He points out that federal judges receive life 
 
67 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 433. 
68 Id. at 458. 
69 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162 (2002); see also Eskridge, supra note 55, at 1409 (explaining that federal courts 
traditionally give especially strong stare decisis effect to interpretive decisions because 
Congress could amend a statute to overrule an erroneous or problematic decision). 
70 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 459. 
71 It is widely recognized that state court judges may have closer ties to the state 
legislature and other elected officials than most federal judges. See, e.g., ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 299-301 (2009); Bruhl, supra 
note 13, at 462-63. 
72 See Bruhl, supra note 13, at 459-63. 
73 Id. at 470. 
74 Id. at 471-72. 
75 Id. at 470-86. 
76 Id. at 486-94. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, which focuses primarily on 
the potential relevance of judicial elections to interpretive methodology, see Aaron-Andrew 
P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1215 (2012). 
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tenure when they are appointed, whereas state judges are typically elected to 
fixed terms or required to face voters in a retention election after the term for 
which they are initially appointed.77 Moreover, the method for appointing 
judges within a single judicial system frequently varies in formal or functional 
ways based on the court’s level within the judicial hierarchy. For example, 
while U.S. Supreme Court Justices are formally appointed pursuant to the same 
process as federal district court judges, the appointment processes differ in 
substantial ways as a practical matter.78 Bruhl’s basic thesis is that elected 
judges, or judges whose selection process involves greater visibility and public 
scrutiny, should arguably have greater leeway to interpret ambiguous statutes 
in a manner that involves greater policymaking discretion on behalf of their 
respective constituencies.79 
Bruhl’s proposal for “heterogeneity” in statutory interpretation differs from 
the proposals to enact codified rules of statutory interpretation or give stare 
decisis effect to interpretive methodology because it would likely result in less 
simplicity or uniformity.80 Nonetheless, his proposal should still be viewed as 
an important part of the broader trend toward the dumbing down of statutory 
interpretation because it would effectively result in lower standards for lower 
courts. Indeed, Bruhl explicitly concludes that lower courts should be more 
deferential to other decision-makers when they interpret statutes, which means 
that they should “heavily defer to agency interpretations,” give substantial 
weight to the dicta of higher courts, and “hesitate before departing from views 
embraced by many of their peers at the same level of the judiciary.”81 
Moreover, when lower courts are genuinely faced with issues of first 
impression, Bruhl contends that they should emphasize reasonable 
interpretations of the enacted text that avoid “generating awkward results,” 
while eschewing ambitious policymaking and being “extremely wary of 
delving into legislative history.”82 In short, Bruhl contends that lower courts 
should generally adopt something like the “no frills textualism” discussed in 
the following section, irrespective of the method of statutory interpretation that 
would be most appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
77 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 488-89. 
78 See id. at 488. 
79 See id. at 491-94; see also Bruhl & Leib, supra note 76.  
80 See Bruhl, supra note 13, at 440 (recognizing that if his analysis is correct, “then the 
vertical aspect of the uniformity program is mistaken” because “[l]ower courts should not be 
required to follow the same rules as the high court if the aptness of those rules is place-
specific”). On the other hand, Bruhl argues that if a uniform interpretive methodology is 
viewed as essential, higher courts could be expected to follow the interpretive methodology 
that is appropriate for lower courts, rather than the other way around. Id. at 457-58. 
81 Id. at 494-95. 
82 Id. at 495.  
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D. No Frills Textualism 
In one of the most important recent lines of work on statutory interpretation, 
Adrian Vermeule claims that theoretical disagreements regarding the best 
interpretive methodology cannot be settled by resort to the Constitution or 
abstract principles like “legislative supremacy” or “democracy.”83 He also 
points out that since any ideal theory of statutory interpretation would need to 
be implemented by real people in actual institutions, the capacities of decision-
makers and the systemic effects of their methodologies must be considered in 
reaching conclusions about how statutes should be interpreted.84 Vermeule 
calls for an “institutional turn” in the academic literature, which would 
necessarily include a prominent empirical dimension devoted to assessing the 
costs and benefits of particular interpretive techniques.85 Vermeule contends 
that the advocates of different foundational theories could reach “incompletely 
theorized agreements” on how statutes should be interpreted in practice based 
on the results of an institutional analysis.86 For example, intentionalists might 
agree with textualists that courts should not consult legislative history because 
the costs of this practice exceed the benefits even from an intentionalist 
perspective.87 
In conducting his own institutional analysis of how courts should interpret 
statutes, Vermeule acknowledges that most of the relevant empirical data do 
not exist and would be difficult to obtain.88 He therefore draws lessons from a 
variety of other academic disciplines regarding what decision-makers should 
do under conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality.89 Vermeule argues 
that the relevant decision-making techniques—which include cost-benefit 
analysis, the principle of insufficient reason, maximin, satisficing, picking, and 
fast and frugal heuristics—suggest that “courts’ foremost concern should be to 
minimize their interpretive ambitions, especially by minimizing the costs of 
judicial decisionmaking and of legal uncertainty.”90 His central point is that the 
judiciary’s use of legislative history and other flexible, dynamic, or policy-
oriented methods of statutory interpretation, which potentially consider a broad 
range of information or evidence, impose certain and substantial costs on the 
 
83 VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 31-33 (“[T]he decisive considerations in choosing 
methods of constitutional interpretation are necessarily institutional, rather than high-level 
claims about constitutionalism, democracy, or the nature of law.”). 
84 Id. at 76-79 (discussing how institutional realities such as human error, limited 
information, personal views or goals, and costs of decisions should be taken into account 
when deciding on a proper interpretive theory). 
85 Id. at 63-85; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and 
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003); Vermeule, supra note 17.  
86 VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 82-83. 
87 See id. at 82. 
88 Id. at 153-54. 
89 Id. at 154-56. 
90 Id. at 150. 
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legal system, while providing only speculative benefits in return. Vermeule 
therefore concludes that those methods of statutory interpretation should not be 
used for institutional reasons. He calls for “interpretive modesty” from the 
judiciary, which would push its methodology “toward rules rather than 
standards, and toward a relatively small, tractable, and cheap set of interpretive 
tools rather than a relatively large, complex, and expensive set.”91 
In contrast to his skeptical view of the institutional capacity of courts, 
Vermeule has a great deal of confidence in the ability of administrative 
agencies to use a wide range of interpretive resources effectively and to 
determine when it is worthwhile to look beyond the surface meaning of 
statutory text.92 He therefore proposes a two-step approach to statutory 
interpretation by the judiciary. First, he claims that “[w]hen the statutory text 
directly at hand is clear and specific, judges should stick close to its surface or 
apparent meaning, eschewing the use of other tools to enrich their sense of 
meaning, intentions, or purposes.”93 Second, he contends that “[w]hen the 
statutory text at hand is ambiguous or vague, judges should defer to the 
interpretations of administrative agencies or executive agents rather than 
attempting to fill in gaps or ambiguities by reference to other sources.”94 
Vermeule also argues that “judges should apply a strong doctrine of statutory 
precedent, subject, however, to defeasance by later administrative 
interpretations.”95 Because Vermeule’s proposed methodology would preclude 
courts from considering “legislative history, many of the canons of 
construction, and holistic textual comparison, which supplements or overrides 
the provisions at hand by reference to other provisions of the same or other 
statutes,”96 as well as other more dynamic or policy-oriented considerations, 
Bill Eskridge has aptly referred to this approach as “no frills textualism.”97 
Vermeule’s proposed approach is, of course, also a vivid example of the recent 
trend toward the dumbing down of statutory interpretation. 
 
91 Id.  
92 See id. at 205-15 (discussing the institutional advantages that agencies have over 
courts in interpreting ambiguous statutes). 
93 Id. at 183.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 Eskridge, supra note 14, at 2043. For another critical review of Vermeule’s proposed 
approach, see Jonathan R. Siegel, Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 387 (2007). See also Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension 
of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952 (2003) (criticizing 
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 85).  
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E. Reading Law 
Justice Antonin Scalia has been one of the most influential participants in 
the interpretive wars over the past thirty years.98 His recent book with Bryan 
Garner, Reading Law, provides a comprehensive statement of his textualist 
theory and preferred methodology.99 In particular, after providing an overview 
of the proposed approach, the treatise articulates and describes fifty-seven 
“sound principles of interpretation,” before “exposing” thirteen “falsehoods” 
about statutory interpretation. Thus, in an effort to provide “the first modern 
attempt, certainly in a century, to collect and arrange only the valid canons 
(perhaps a third of the possible candidates) and to show how and why they 
apply to proper legal interpretation,”100 the treatise boils statutory 
interpretation down to seventy principles or rules that should either be adopted 
or rejected by the judiciary. This effort to facilitate simplicity and uniformity in 
statutory interpretation is consistent with Justice Scalia’s earlier contention that 
“[o]ur highest responsibility in the field of statutory construction is to read the 
laws in a consistent way, giving Congress a sure means by which it may work 
the people’s will.”101 
One could easily question the extent to which Justice Scalia’s textualism 
would, in practice, promote simplicity, uniformity, or consistency in statutory 
interpretation, given its heavy reliance on complex linguistic, historical, and 
holistic textual analysis, which may exceed the capacity of most judges.102 
Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook claims in the book’s foreword that the 
judiciary’s rate of agreement in statutory cases would undoubtedly be higher if 
Justice Scalia’s proposed methods were more widely followed, and the book is 
clearly a self-conscious effort to promote a single, relatively coherent set of 
interpretive rules for the federal courts.103 Indeed, the first sentence of the 
treatise contends that “[o]ur legal system must regain a mooring that it has lost: 
 
98 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (Amy Gutmann et al. eds. 1997); see also Frickey, supra note 2, at 254-55 (crediting 
Scalia with helping to revive interest in statutory interpretation). 
99 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15.  
100 Id. at 9 (footnote omitted). 
101 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Gluck, 
supra note 8, at 1834 (recognizing that one of the most prominent goals of Justice Scalia’s 
new textualism is to promote “‘rule-of-law’ norms” and generate “a predictable, formalized 
approach that can clarify the interpretive process for legislatures, lower courts, and 
litigants”). 
102 See VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 259 (“Even Antonin Scalia, one of originalism’s 
chief defenders, says that ‘[p]roperly done, the task requires the consideration of an 
enormous mass of material’ and ‘an evaluation of the reliability of the material’; in general 
originalism is ‘a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
103 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at xxiv.  
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a generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal texts.”104 Given 
his explicit aspiration to provide such an approach, it seems fair to include 
Justice Scalia’s textualism in general, and Reading Law in particular, as part of 
the broader trend toward the dumbing down of statutory interpretation. 
F. Interpretive Regimes 
The foregoing proposals or methods were all inspired to varying degrees by 
the insight that statutory interpretation doctrine can provide what John 
Ferejohn has called an “interpretive regime.”105 According to Bill Eskridge and 
Phillip Frickey, “[a]n interpretive regime is a system of background norms and 
conventions against which the Court will read statutes.”106 When such a regime 
is in place, it “tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens how strings of 
words in statutes will be read, what presumptions will be entertained as to [a 
statute’s] scope and meaning, and what auxiliary materials might be consulted 
to resolve ambiguities.”107 Interpretive regimes facilitate coordination and 
promote the rule of law by lowering the costs of drafting for Congress and 
rendering the application of statutes more predictable.108 When the participants 
in the legislative process are familiar with the prevailing interpretive regime, 
they can more easily predict the impact of different statutory language and 
draft their statutes accordingly.109 Moreover, “by clarifying the background 
rules against which Congress is legislating, interpretive regimes aid in 
effectuating congressional intent.”110 Interpretive regimes are thereby thought 
to promote the judiciary’s ability to serve as a faithful agent of the legislature, 
which is traditionally viewed as the sine qua non of democratic legitimacy in 
statutory interpretation.111 
Commentators with very different ideological and methodological 
orientations have recognized and embraced the value of having an established 
interpretive regime. Eskridge and Frickey originally touted the idea based on 
an understanding of statutory interpretation as practical reasoning—which 
contemplates the consideration of a wide range of evidence in the construction 
of statutory meaning.112 Other jurists and scholars have apparently concluded 
that if some uniformity, clarity, and predictability are beneficial, more of these 
things must be even better. They have therefore seized on the goal of 
 
104 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at xxvii.  
105 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 16, at 267; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 
16, at 66 (crediting Ferejohn with the term). 
106 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 66.  
107 Id.  
108 See id. at 66-67.  
109 See id. at 67.  
110 Foster, supra note 12, at 1887 (footnote omitted).  
111 See infra Part II.A. 
112 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 56-57; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 
30.  
  
226 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:209 
 
establishing an interpretive regime to advocate the dumbing down of statutory 
interpretation. 
II. DRIVERS OF THE TREND 
Before evaluating this trend, it is worthwhile to unpack its animating 
assumptions. This Part explains that the proposals and methods described 
above are uniformly driven by a shared understanding of the need to constrain 
judicial discretion, the desirability of rule-based decision-making, the 
exclusivity of traditional sources of legal authority, and statutory 
interpretation’s role in constructing legal meaning. The next Part will question 
the validity, or at least the primacy, of each of these assumptions. 
A. The Perceived Need to Constrain Judicial Discretion 
The traditional understanding of statutory interpretation is that the judiciary 
should serve as the faithful agent of the legislature.113 As “honest agents of the 
political branches,” courts “carry out decisions they do not make.”114 Because 
statutory interpretation implements previous decisions by an elected legislature 
and does not involve creative policymaking by courts, the enterprise is 
consistent with, and indeed, affirmatively facilitates, majoritarian democracy. 
If Congress disagrees with a judicial decision or wants to change the law for 
other reasons, it is the legislature’s responsibility to amend the statute pursuant 
to the constitutionally mandated procedures. From this perspective, the 
democratic pedigree of statutory interpretation is impeccable because elected 
officials who are politically accountable to voters are making all of the 
important policy decisions.115 
 The traditional view has been difficult to sustain for a variety of reasons.116 
First, the legal realist movement and contemporary theories of interpretation 
have highlighted the inherent imprecision of language and the severe 
limitations on legislative foresight.117 It is therefore widely accepted that the 
legislature does not resolve every issue that arises in statutory interpretation 
and that courts have considerable interpretive leeway. Second, the rise of the 
 
113 This brief description of the traditional understanding and its shortcomings is drawn 
from my other recent work on statutory interpretation. See Glen Staszewski, Contestatory 
Democracy and the Interpretation of Popular Initiatives, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1165, 
1169-70 (2013); Staszewski, supra note 27, at 231; see also Manning, supra note 22, at 5 
(“[I]f Congress legislates within constitutional boundaries, the federal judge’s constitutional 
duty is to decode and follow its commands . . . .”); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The 
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594-
95, 599-603 (1995) (discussing the principle of “legislative supremacy”). 
114 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 60 (1984).  
115 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 231. 
116 Id. at 223-24; Staszewski, supra note 113, at 1169. 
117 See Schacter, supra note 113, at 599-603.  
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modern regulatory state has resulted in widespread delegations of broad 
discretionary authority from the legislature to other institutions and a candid 
recognition that the resolution of ambiguities in federal regulatory statutes 
necessarily involves policymaking.118 Third, recent developments in political 
science have undermined the optimistic pluralistic conception of the legislative 
process that underlies the traditional model and called into question voters’ 
capacities to hold elected officials accountable for their policy decisions.119 
While these insights have led some jurists and scholars to reject faithful agent 
theory in favor of theories of statutory interpretation that envision courts as 
“cooperative partners” of the legislature,120 the dominant reaction has been a 
renewed effort to limit judicial discretion by resorting to formalism and relying 
more heavily on statutory text.121 
The latter strategy for promoting legislative supremacy and democratic 
legitimacy is most clearly illustrated by the preferred approaches of committed 
textualists, such as Justice Scalia and Professor Vermeule, who “believe that 
by emphasizing statutory text over statutory purposes, and by excluding 
legislative history in particular, they can cabin judicial leeway and go a long 
way toward minimizing judicial flexibility.”122 Jonathan Molot has pointed out, 
however, that “[i]t is not just self-proclaimed textualists who have moved 
toward limiting judicial discretion and hewing more closely to statutory 
text.”123 Rather, mainstream “[j]udges and scholars generally accept that courts 
should be faithful to legislative instructions and follow laws enacted through 
bicameralism and presentment, rather than make new laws themselves.”124 
Molot contends that the prevailing consensus in statutory interpretation “is to 
respond to the countermajoritarian difficulty with judicial power by curbing 
judicial discretion and hewing closely to statutory text.”125 
 It is therefore not surprising that, like arguments for textualism, the 
remaining proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation are also responsive 
to the perceived problem of judicial discretion. Specifically, if federal courts 
 
118 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
119 See Schacter, supra note 113, at 603-06. 
120 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982) 
(proposing “granting to courts the authority to determine whether a statute is obsolete”); 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313-14 (1986) (developing an interpretative theory under 
which “judges should interpret statutes under law as integrity”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-49 (1994) (discussing the dynamic evolution of 
statutes and the role of agencies and justices in this evolution).  
121 See, e.g., Molot, supra note 5, at 30-36; see also Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence 
About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2007) (discussing the popularity of textualism 
among justices and scholars).  
122 Molot, supra note 121, at 9 (footnote omitted).  
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 11-12. 
125 Id. at 12.  
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were to adopt a consistent and predictable interpretive regime, it would be 
significantly easier for Congress to draft statutes that would accomplish its 
legal and policy objectives. This would, in turn, limit the policymaking 
discretion of federal courts in statutory interpretation. Not only would the use 
of simplified methods of statutory interpretation reduce the policymaking 
discretion of lower courts, but Professor Bruhl explicitly justifies his proposal 
on the grounds that lower court judges typically have a less meaningful 
policymaking mandate than elected judges with statewide constituencies or 
federal judges who are nominated and confirmed to serve on higher courts.126 
If Congress were to enact Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, judicial 
discretion would be severely constrained, and the federal judiciary would be 
required to follow Congress’s “meta-intent” regarding the proper interpretation 
of statutes. Federal courts could therefore truly be said to be acting as the 
faithful agents of Congress during statutory interpretation, even if the text of 
any particular statute was ambiguous. Finally, if federal courts were to give 
stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology, they could eventually “fix” the 
rules and thereby eliminate judicial discretion to revisit the best approach to 
statutory interpretation on a case-by-case basis in the absence of a special 
justification.127 The dumbing down of statutory interpretation should therefore 
ultimately be understood as part of a broader strategy for justifying judicial 
power over statutory interpretation in a democracy. 
B. The Perceived Need for Clarity and Predictability 
Besides limiting judicial discretion, the proponents of the foregoing 
proposals are also trying to demand greater clarity and predictability in 
interpretive methodology to promote “the rule of law as a law of rules.”128 
There is a widely recognized dichotomy between governance by “general rule 
of law” and “personal discretion to do justice” in each particular case.129 As 
explained above, interpretive methodology is currently treated by federal 
courts as an area in which judges are authorized to exercise “personal 
discretion to do justice” in each particular case.130 This is true because federal 
judges are permitted to decide on a case-by-case basis which interpretive 
methodology is most appropriate. The reform proposals at issue seek to 
 
126 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 491-94.  
127 Cf. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 8-21 (2001) (discussing the capacity of stare decisis to “fix” the meaning of 
otherwise ambiguous laws). 
128 See Scalia, supra note 17. 
129 Id. at 1175-76; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 
956-57 (1995) (discussing the difference between two different forms of legal judgment: the 
case-by-case model and the general rule model). There is, of course, a closely related debate 
on the merits of rules versus standards. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
130 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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establish general rules of statutory interpretation and thereby shift interpretive 
methodology to the opposite side of this dichotomy. 
The arguments in favor of the reform proposals largely track the standard 
arguments that are made by enthusiasts for general rules. One of those 
arguments is that bright-line rules have the capacity to limit the discretion of 
the decision-makers who are responsible for implementing the law.131 The 
enactment of bright-line rules tends to be a particularly good strategy when 
lawmakers have different preferences from the officials who will be 
implementing a mandate or when the legislative process is thought to have 
superior democratic legitimacy.132 Of course, this benefit is closely tied to the 
goal of limiting judicial discretion, which is discussed in the previous section. 
In addition, the promulgation of general rules substantially limits decision 
costs because clear rules are significantly cheaper and easier to implement than 
ex post decisions based on every potentially relevant consideration.133 The 
promulgation of bright-line rules also provides advance notice of precisely 
what the law requires, which is particularly important in a modern regulatory 
state with widely dispersed authority.134 Bright-line rules also promote 
predictability, consistency, and uniformity in the application of law, and 
thereby facilitate planning.135 
The promulgation and implementation of general rules is also thought to 
promote the rule of law in various other ways. For example, a uniform set of 
clear-cut rules helps to ensure that similarly situated people are treated alike 
and thereby limits the possibility of arbitrary discrimination by public officials 
who might otherwise implement the law in a biased or otherwise problematic 
way.136 Moreover, rule-based decision-making potentially minimizes 
shortsightedness and helps give public officials the courage to make difficult or 
unpopular decisions that will ultimately promote more enduring principles or 
values.137 Justice Scalia has argued that adherence to general rules also 
promotes the rule of law by providing the appearance of equal treatment 
because a rule’s authority can often provide a legitimate justification for a 
decision.138 General rules are also thought to facilitate collective decision-
making in a pluralistic democracy because they can more easily produce 
incompletely theorized agreements at both the enactment and the 
 
131 See Manning, supra note 22, at 70; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES 98-99, 158-62 (1991). 
132 See e.g., Scalia, supra note 17, at 1176 (“In a democratic system, of course, the 
general rule of law has special claim to preference, since it is the normal product of that 
branch of government most responsive to the people.”). 
133 See Sunstein, supra note 129, at 972-73. 
134 See Scalia, supra note 17, at 1179. 
135 See id.; Sunstein, supra note 129, at 976. 
136 See Sunstein, supra note 129, at 974-75.  
137 See Scalia, supra note 17, at 1180; Sunstein, supra note 129, at 975-76. 
138 Scalia, supra note 17, at 1178.  
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implementation stages.139 For example, judges might more readily agree on the 
“plain meaning” of a statutory provision than on whether a particular 
application furthers the statute’s underlying purposes or results in justice or 
good policy, all things considered.140 Finally, when general rules are 
reasonably clear and uniformly applied, it may be easier for the public to hold 
lawmakers accountable for their policy choices, and it may be correspondingly 
more difficult for wealthy or politically influential constituents to obtain 
“special treatment” through the legislative, administrative, or judicial 
processes.141 
Given these potential advantages, it is not surprising that “extravagant 
enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly rule-bound conception of the rule of 
law” is “a pervasive social phenomenon,”142 or that efforts to capitalize on the 
perceived advantages of general rules would become popular in statutory 
interpretation.143 As explained above, the proposals to dumb down statutory 
interpretation uniformly advocate the creation of a relatively simple or binding 
set of rules for statutory interpretation, which would allegedly provide greater 
clarity and predictability in the interpretive enterprise and thereby promote a 
relatively formal vision of the rule of law.144 
C. The Traditional Legal Sources of Interpretive Methodology 
One of the most interesting and important aspects of Abbe Gluck’s recent 
work on statutory interpretation is her observation that the legal status of 
interpretive methodology remains unresolved.145 She has focused on this 
question primarily in the context of the Erie problem and other situations in 
which courts in one jurisdiction must interpret statutes adopted by the 
legislature of another jurisdiction.146 In this situation, a court in the forum state 
 
139 See Sunstein, supra note 129, at 971-72; see also VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 85, 
116-17 (claiming that institutional considerations can produce incompletely theorized 
agreements on interpretive methodology by judges and scholars with fundamentally 
different theoretical commitments).  
140 See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of 
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 231.  
141 Cf. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2434-37 
(2003) (linking the benefits of bright-line rules to the American constitutional structure); 
Sunstein, supra note 129, at 977 (recognizing that the costs of case-by-case decision-making 
in litigation may systematically favor the well-to-do). 
142 Sunstein, supra note 129, at 957. 
143 I have sought to capitalize on the perceived advantages of rulemaking in other 
contexts. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 43; Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of 
Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 395 (2003). 
144 See supra Part I.  
145 See Gluck, supra note 8, at 1750; Gluck, supra note 12, at 1909-19; see also Criddle 
& Staszewski, supra note 36, at 1577 (discussing this aspect of Gluck’s work). 
146 See generally Gluck, supra note 12. 
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may need to determine whether to follow the same interpretive methodology as 
the courts in the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature. For example, should 
federal courts follow the same methodology as state courts when the federal 
judiciary interprets state statutes? Should state courts follow the same 
methodology as federal courts when state courts interpret federal statutes? 
Should Michigan courts follow the same methodology as Wisconsin courts 
when Michigan courts interpret Wisconsin statutes?  
To the extent that relevant jurisdictions do not have uniform or binding rules 
of statutory interpretation, these questions would seem largely academic. 
Gluck has pointed out, however, that some states have adopted frameworks for 
statutory interpretation that are treated as binding within those jurisdictions.147 
Nonetheless, most courts have not provided clear, consistent, or thoughtful 
answers to the foregoing questions,148 which would presumably depend at least 
in part on whether interpretive methodology is properly considered a form of 
law and, if so, whether it is substantive or procedural.149 Accordingly, we 
currently have no clear answers to the fundamental question of the legal status 
of interpretive methodology. 
The important point, for present purposes, is that the proponents of dumbing 
down statutory interpretation seem to assume that interpretive methodology is 
a form of “law,” and they rely on the traditional hierarchy of legal sources to 
identify its legal status.150 The traditional hierarchy of legal sources maintains, 
in turn, that all law in a constitutional democracy must stem from the 
Constitution, validly enacted statutes, or the common law (in that order of 
authority)—and that there is not a fourth alternative.151 Accordingly, the 
proponents of the proposals at issue either contend that their preferred 
methodologies are constitutionally mandated152 or that interpretive 
 
147 Gluck, supra note 8, at 1771-1811. 
148 See Gluck, supra note 12, at 1903 (reporting that an examination of the relevant case 
law reveals that “many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, are getting the Erie 
question wrong,” or that “they are not sufficiently aware that the question exists in the first 
place”); id. at 1924 (finding that “federal courts are wholly inconsistent about whether state 
or federal methodology applies to state statutes”).  
149 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (“The laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of 
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”); 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (setting forth an analysis for assessing whether 
federal courts must follow state law in diversity cases); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (balancing the importance of the usual federal practice against 
the likelihood of a different result in state court under state procedure). 
150 See Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 36, at 1578.  
151 Gluck recognizes that, in theory, interpretive methodology could be another form of 
law, but she declines seriously to pursue this intriguing possibility. Gluck, supra note 12, at 
1907; cf. infra Part III.C (suggesting that interpretive methodology should be understood as 
a distinct form of law in the modern regulatory state).  
152 John Manning is the leading scholarly proponent of the notion that principles of 
statutory interpretation can be derived from the structure of the Constitution, and that the 
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methodology is generally a judicially created form of common law that could 
be overridden by statute,153 and should, in any event, be given stare decisis 
effect like most other legal decisions.154 
More specifically, Justice Scalia contends that a proper understanding of 
American constitutional democracy mandates the most fundamental aspects of 
his proposed methodology for reading law. For example, Scalia relies on the 
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, fundamental 
principles of separated powers, and his theory of democracy to maintain that 
the proper goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the original meaning 
of the text to an ordinary speaker of English, rather than to ascertain the 
legislature’s intent.155 The precise sources of authority for his remaining 
 
available structural inferences and historical evidence counsel against “the equity of the 
statute” and “the absurdity doctrine” and in favor of textualism. See Manning, supra note 
22; Manning, supra note 141; see also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999); John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997). But see VERMEULE, supra note 14, 
at 29-33 (criticizing Manning’s view). While Scalia’s approach differs in some respects, he 
seems to share Manning’s basic view of the possibility of deriving concrete principles of 
statutory interpretation from a proper understanding of the Constitution. See infra notes 155-
157 and accompanying text; John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33 (2006) (taking stock of Justice Scalia’s approach). 
153 See Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2140 (“To the extent that the judicial power 
includes power to develop interpretive rules, that power is a federal common lawmaking 
power, which a contrary statute may trump.”); see also Scott, supra note 46, at 344 
(“Because the canons are nothing more than common law, legislative enactments that 
repudiate or support canons should not only be included in any conversation about the 
canons, but also considered important and controlling.”).  
154 See Foster, supra note 12, at 1868-69 (claiming that “statutory interpretation doctrines 
can be classified according to whether they are derived from a statute, the common law, or 
the Constitution” and arguing that the Court should give doctrines of statutory interpretation 
stronger stare decisis effect than the substantive decisions emanating from each of the 
respective legal sources); Gluck, supra note 8, at 1846-62 (claiming that “the ability of the 
state courts . . . to articulate a single methodological approach” and thereby treat interpretive 
methodology as “law” naturally raises “the question of why statutory interpretation 
methodology should be treated differently” and providing a normative argument in favor of 
“methodological consensus”); Gluck, supra note 12, at 1907, 1912-17 (arguing that “as a 
matter of both doctrine and theory, there are compelling reasons to reconceptualize federal 
statutory interpretation methodology as law” and drawing an analogy to “federal common 
law”); Gluck, supra note 64, at 757 (exploring the possibility that interpretive methodology 
is a form of judge-made common law). 
155 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 82 (“Originalism is the only approach 
to text that is compatible with democracy.” (emphasis added)); id. at 233 (arguing that the 
attribution of “fair meaning” to “public texts” is an “unremovable duty of the courts”); id. at 
345 (“The very nature of the constitution requires the judges to follow the letter of the 
law.”) (quoting Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (pt. 1) 75 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)); 
id. at 397-98 (claiming that “[t]he traditional view is that an enacted text is itself the law” 
and “that ‘it demeans the constitutionally prescribed method of legislating to suppose that its 
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principles of statutory interpretation are less clear and more varied, but he 
relies quite heavily on both “logic” and “tradition” to flesh out the proper 
methods for reading law in a constitutional democracy.156 Some of his 
subsidiary principles might be considered common law rules of statutory 
interpretation that could be modified over time by federal courts or Congress, 
but Justice Scalia contends that a serious effort by Congress to codify binding 
rules of statutory interpretation would raise significant constitutional 
difficulties based on the separation of powers.157 He therefore seems to suggest 
that while federal judges could potentially tinker with his proposed 
methodology at the margins, a proper understanding of the fundamental 
principles of our constitutional democracy mandates the central principles of 
textualism.  
Professor Vermeule shares Justice Scalia’s preference for a version of 
textualism, but he strongly disagrees with the position that any particular 
interpretive methodology can be derived from the U.S. Constitution or abstract 
principles like democracy or separation of powers.158 In this regard, Vermeule 
argues that “[t]he Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say a great deal 
about the contested issues of statutory interpretation[,]” and that “what it does 
say is often so minimal and so abstract as to leave open all the contested 
questions of interpretive choice.”159 He therefore concludes that “[t]he best 
reading of the Constitution is that interpretive formalism and interpretive 
antiformalism are constitutionally optional for judges.”160 As a result, 
Vermeule argues that the resolution of disputed questions about how to 
interpret statutes will necessarily “require empirical and institutional analysis 
in addition to first-best theorizing from constitutional premises,”161 and he 
suggests that the federal judiciary’s answers to these questions should be 
understood as a form of common law that could vary over time based on the 
available information.162 
 
elaborate apparatus for deliberation on, amending, and approving a text is just a way to 
create some evidence about the law, while the real source of legal rules is the mental 
processes of legislators’” (emphasis added) (quoting In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.))). 
156 See, e.g., id. at 233 (“Logical reasoning is the duty of courts, and not even the 
legislature can exclude it.”); id. at 369 (“From the beginnings of the republic, American law 
followed what is known as the ‘no-recourse doctrine’—that in the interpretation of a text, no 
recourse may be had to legislative history.”). 
157 Id. at 43-44, 243-46.  
158 VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 29-34, 75-76.  
159 Id. at 31. 
160 Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
161 Id. 
162 Vermeule acknowledges that his proposed methodology for statutory interpretation is 
provisional and that his conclusions might change in response to better information about 
the institutional variables. Id. at 289-90. He also suggests that the prevailing approaches to 
statutory interpretation have changed over time based on shifts in behavior by the relevant 
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Professor Rosenkranz gives more credence to the idea that the validity of 
specific interpretive doctrines could be influenced in a meaningful way by the 
Constitution, and he develops an elaborate framework for assessing the 
constitutional status of a wide range of interpretive techniques.163 He 
nonetheless concludes that the vast majority of interpretive principles are 
judicially created common law that could permissibly be displaced by a duly 
enacted statute.164 Similarly, while Professor Bruhl agrees that the interpretive 
techniques used by federal courts must be constitutionally permissible and that 
some interpretive choices may be required or prohibited by the Constitution, he 
concludes that “the types of interpretive choices” that he addresses “are 
essentially matters of common law in the sense that they could be changed by 
either courts or legislatures.”165 Foster and Gluck seem to take essentially the 
same position, and they proceed to maintain that if interpretive methodology is, 
at bottom, a set of judicially created common law rules, interpretive 
methodology should be given stare decisis effect, just like most other judicial 
decisions.166 Indeed, Foster argues that interpretive methodology should be 
given even stronger stare decisis effect than comparable substantive decisions 
based on the overarching need for a clear and predictable interpretive regime in 
this area.167 By treating most aspects of interpretive methodology as judicially 
created common law, these scholars make the establishment of a simplified or 
uniform set of interpretive rules possible, even if the Constitution does not 
mandate any particular interpretive methodology. 
D. Interpretation As Constructed Meaning 
The final assumption driving the proposals is a common belief that statutory 
interpretation’s function is to ascertain the meaning of the law. This trend in 
the literature leaves room for disagreement about precisely how this should be 
done, but these jurists and scholars seem to agree that when a federal court has 
finished interpreting a federal statute, the end result is “to say what the law 
is.”168 Interpretive methodology is essentially understood as the process by 
which courts attribute meaning to the law. The dumbing down of statutory 
interpretation is based on the notion that if courts adopted a simple, consistent, 
and uniform interpretive methodology, they could facilitate clarity and 
predictability in legal meaning, and thereby limit judicial discretion and 
promote the rule of law. 
 
legal actors. Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
149 (2001). 
163 Rosenkranz, supra note 11, at 2092-2140. 
164 Id. at 2140. 
165 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 445 n.23.  
166 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
167 Foster, supra note 12, at 1884-97.  
168 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).  
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Most accounts of statutory interpretation divide the task of ascertaining the 
meaning of the law into two components or stages, which correspond roughly 
to the framework for reviewing the legality of interpretive decisions by 
administrative agencies under Chevron. The first stage examines whether the 
statute has a clear meaning with respect to the precise question at issue,169 and 
nearly everyone agrees that federal courts are typically obligated to give effect 
to the unambiguous meaning of the statutes enacted by Congress.170 Different 
interpretive methodologies differ, however, with respect to how they go about 
assessing whether a statute’s meaning is unambiguous and in their degree of 
willingness to recognize or acknowledge statutory ambiguity. Federal courts 
therefore disagree about precisely how they should implement the first step of 
the Chevron inquiry.171 In any event, nearly everyone agrees that at some point 
the meaning of the law on a particular question is best described as ambiguous, 
and courts therefore need to select and apply interpretive rules or methods to 
resolve the ambiguity and fix the content of the law.172 Although Chevron 
recognizes that agencies can lawfully adopt a range of “reasonable” 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions over time, the judiciary has 
traditionally given ambiguous federal statutes a single fixed meaning,173 and 
this is generally still the case outside of Chevron’s limited domain.174 The key 
point is that the function of statutory interpretation is widely viewed as 
 
169 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  
170 See id. at 842-43 (setting forth the Court’s recognition of this principle). Most judges 
and scholars would recognize exceptions to this rule when a statute contains a scrivener’s 
error or when its plain meaning would lead to absurd results. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11126 (2002). 
These exceptions are controversial within textualist theory. See Manning, supra note 141; 
John C. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 2, 2002, at 1, 
available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art15 (describing the exceptions, but ultimately 
concluding that they are infrequently used and of marginal benefit). Some courts and 
commentators maintain, however, that scrivener’s errors and unintended absurdities can be 
understood to create ambiguity, and that such exceptions are therefore fully compatible with 
a norm that requires the judiciary to follow the unambiguous meaning of statutory mandates. 
See, e.g., Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Indeed, 
where a literal reading of a statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply ‘has 
no plain meaning . . . and is the proper subject of construction by the . . . courts.’” (internal 
citation omitted)); Sunstein, supra, at 11126 (arguing that agencies should be permitted to 
interpret statutes to avoid absurd results even when courts should not).  
171 See Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in 
A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55, 55-84 (John F. 
Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (describing the different approaches). 
172 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405 (1989) (emphasizing the need to invoke background principles or norms to 
resolve difficult statutory cases). 
173 See Nelson, supra note 127, at 14-15 (discussing the historical trend). 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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ascertaining the meaning of the law, and “interpretive methodology” 
determines how this is done, both in terms of identifying and enforcing 
unambiguous statutory mandates and in choosing and applying the principles 
or rules for resolving statutory ambiguity. Some methodological approaches 
undoubtedly place greater importance on the distinction between clarity and 
ambiguity than others,175 but even the most pragmatic theories of statutory 
interpretation tend to assume that the basic function of the enterprise is to 
ascertain the meaning of the law in a particular case.176 
The foregoing understanding of the function of statutory interpretation and 
the role of interpretive methodology is central to each of the proposals to dumb 
down statutory interpretation. The common strategy is to provide simple, clear, 
and consistent rules for identifying and enforcing unambiguous statutory 
mandates, as well as simple, clear, and consistent rules for resolving statutory 
ambiguity. The proposals also seem to anticipate the creation or adoption of a 
simple, clear, and consistent hierarchical or tiered framework for proceeding 
through the various stages of the analysis in statutory cases.177 Indeed, the 
overarching goal is to provide a relatively simple formula for ascertaining the 
meaning of the law in any particular case.178 In sum, if federal courts would 
just agree to adopt one or more of the foregoing proposals, they could 
dramatically simplify the interpretive process, minimize judicial discretion, 
and potentially improve the clarity and predictability of legal meaning. The 
interpretive wars would, for all intents and purposes, finally be over, and we 
could all move on to more useful and productive things. 
III. REEVALUATING THE ASSUMPTIONS 
If only things were so simple. It is true, of course, that each of the foregoing 
assumptions is both widely held and deeply rooted in contemporary public law 
theory, and that helps to explain the popularity of the trend toward dumbing 
down statutory interpretation among a truly brilliant and otherwise 
ideologically diverse group of scholars and judges. The animating goal of this 
Article, however, is to challenge these prevailing assumptions and to articulate 
 
175 See Molot, supra note 5, at 45-48 (criticizing strict textualists for aggressively seeking 
to eliminate ambiguity from statutory interpretation and claiming that this tactic magnifies 
the differences between textualism and purposivism). 
176 See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 30, at 345-62 (identifying and describing 
the philosophies of meaning that underlie their approach); id. at 347 (describing “the 
creation of statutory meaning” that occurs when courts interpret statutes). 
177 See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
178 Thus, for example, Scalia maintains (incredibly, in my view) that application of his 
fifty-seven correct principles of statutory interpretation will lead to a single correct answer 
in most cases. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 6 (“As we hope to demonstrate, 
most interpretive questions have a right answer.”); id. at 232 (suggesting that ambiguities 
can always be resolved by “the normal tools of interpretation”); id. at 401 (“In most cases—
and especially the most controversial ones—the originalist answer is entirely clear.”). 
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a fundamentally different way of thinking about these matters. This Part claims 
that rather than seeking to eliminate judicial discretion, the goal of statutory 
interpretation methodology should be to protect the people from the possibility 
of arbitrary domination by the state. It proceeds to argue that the best way to 
achieve this goal is for courts to engage in practical reasoning when they 
interpret statutes and for public officials with diverse perspectives to give 
reasoned explanations for their decisions. This Part also contends that the 
traditional hierarchy of law is outdated and that interpretive methodology and 
agency action should be recognized as distinct forms of law in a new legal 
hierarchy for the regulatory state. Finally, this Part claims that the function of 
statutory interpretation is to provide the people with opportunities to contest 
the validity of governmental action, rather than to ascertain the meaning of the 
law in a vacuum. The final Part of the Article concludes that the dumbing 
down of statutory interpretation is fundamentally misguided, and it sets forth 
some principled limitations on the extent to which interpretive methodology 
can or should be simple or uniform. 
A. The Importance of Avoiding Domination 
The proponents of the proposals at issue exhibit the classic liberal anxiety 
that is engendered by judicial discretion in a democracy, and they seek to limit 
judicial policymaking as much as possible.179 Eliminating judicial discretion 
from statutory interpretation is impossible, however, and there are good 
reasons to question whether the proposals at issue would necessarily constrain 
judges in difficult cases where the text is ambiguous or where the clear text 
would lead to absurd results or unreasonable consequences.180 Moreover, to the 
extent that the proposals would establish artificial decision-making 
frameworks that would resolve statutory disputes without regard to their policy 
consequences or Congress’s apparent goals, the result would be affirmatively 
undemocratic.181 
Justice Scalia has argued that “[o]riginalism is the only approach to text that 
is compatible with democracy,”182 and he has boasted that “[i]t takes a theory 
to beat a theory and, after a decade of trying, the opponents of originalism have 
never converged on an appealing and practical alternative.”183 This section 
 
179 See supra Part II.A.  
180 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15) (claiming that 
Scalia’s approach would not eliminate unpredictability or judicial policymaking from 
statutory interpretation). 
181 See id. at 567-75 (explaining that a “canons-based textualism” poses a problem for 
democracy that “is especially acute when judges apply canons of construction that they have 
created and ignore legislative history that Congress has created”). 
182 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 82. 
183 Id. at 92 (quoting RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92 (2004)). 
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provides a brief overview of a theory of republican democracy that easily beats 
liberal theory as a foundation for thinking about the role of courts, and it 
compels the conclusion that instead of seeking to eliminate judicial discretion, 
the primary goal of statutory interpretation methodology should be to protect 
the people from the possibility of arbitrary domination by the state. 
Before describing the relevant aspects of this theory, it may be useful to 
flesh out the liberal anxiety with judicial discretion that pervades American 
public law. As Bill Eskridge has explained, “[l]iberalism posits a society of 
autonomous individuals whose interests are incommensurable. These 
autonomous individuals form a social contract to achieve collective goals 
unattainable through private action.”184 Those individuals like to preserve their 
autonomy, however, and they generally prefer to protect the private sphere 
from interference by the state.185 The agreed-upon mechanism for making 
collective decisions on behalf of society is the legislature, which is accountable 
to the people through regular elections.186 Because federal judges are not 
politically accountable, their exercise of policymaking discretion is in severe 
tension with liberal democratic theory.187 Accordingly, liberal democratic 
theory seeks to limit the policymaking discretion of judges by requiring them 
to justify legal decisions as the product of the policy choices of elected 
officials.188 
Liberal theory typically equates freedom with non-interference, and posits 
that government may only legitimately interfere with the freedom of citizens 
through the authoritative decisions of elected representatives. Judicial 
discretion therefore raises the classic problem of “the countermajoritarian 
difficulty” in judicial review and its functional equivalent in statutory 
interpretation.189 Professor Eskridge has persuasively concluded that “it is 
doubtful that any theory will successfully allay liberalism’s anxiety about 
permitting unelected judges to make policy choices that invade private 
interests.”190 
The best strategy for justifying, and indeed genuinely appreciating, the 
inevitable role of judicial discretion in statutory interpretation is therefore to 
move away from the tenets of liberal theory, and to consider principles of 
republican democracy.191 Philip Pettit has recently set forth a theory of 
 
184 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 344 
(1989); see also Staszewski, supra note 27, at 238-39 (relying on Eskridge’s work to explain 
this view). 
185 See Eskridge, supra note 184, at 344. 
186 See id. at 344-45. 
187 See id. at 345. 
188 See id. 
189 See Molot, supra note 121, at 6-7. 
190 Eskridge, supra note 184, at 345.  
191 The following description of Pettit’s theory and its implications for statutory 
interpretation incorporate text from my related work in this area. See Staszewski, supra note 
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democracy that rejects the liberal conception of freedom as non-interference in 
favor of the republican conception of freedom as non-domination.192 From this 
perspective, the primary role of government is to protect freedom, which 
consists of the absence of the possibility of domination by other agents. 
Contrary to the tenets of liberal theory—where regulatory intervention 
necessarily invades liberty—government can promote freedom under this view 
by protecting citizens from the possibility of domination by private parties. 
The problem, of course, is that government can also be a source of domination. 
It is therefore essential for a republican democracy to provide safeguards to 
limit the possibility of domination by the state. 
Pettit explains that limiting the possibility of domination by the state 
requires mechanisms to prevent public officials from ignoring the interests and 
perspectives of ordinary people, and that this argues in favor of the electoral 
dimension of democracy.193 Periodic elections bring government under the 
control of the people in the sense that voters are empowered to select 
candidates for office based on their likelihood of promoting the collective 
interests of the people.194 The republican argument for elections is simply that 
they provide a sensible way to force government to advance the common, 
perceived interests of citizens, and thereby provide a check against potential 
domination by the state.195 
Pettit recognizes, however, that elections can only provide limited protection 
against the possibility of domination because electoral democracy is not 
necessarily responsive to the interests and perspectives of minorities.196 Indeed, 
“it is quite consistent with electoral democracy that government should only 
track the perceived interests of a majority, absolute or relative, on any issue 
and that it [will] have a dominating aspect from the point of view of others.”197 
For this reason, republican theorists have always been concerned about 
providing structural safeguards to prevent the tyranny of the majority.198 “The 
 
27, at 225-29, 240-45, 253-54; Staszewski, supra note 113, at 1171-72. 
192 PETTIT, supra note 29, at 51; Pettit, supra note 29, at 163.  
193 Pettit, supra note 29, at 173.  
194 See id. 
195 See id.; cf. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (claiming that political representation was designed as a 
means of allowing the American people to protect themselves from abuses of power by 
government). 
196 Pettit, supra note 29, at 173-78.  
197 Id. at 174. 
198 See, e.g., Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in 
Republican Government, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102, 104 (Robert A. 
Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980) (“There can be no dispute that the framers 
desired to place certain kinds of restraints on certain kinds of popular majorities.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 44 (1985) (“The 
system of checks and balances within the federal structure was intended to operate as a 
check against self-interested representation and factional tyranny . . . .”).  
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elimination of domination would require, not just that the people considered 
collectively cannot be ignored by government, but also that people considered 
severally or distributively cannot be ignored either.”199 
Pettit therefore considers “whether there is any way of subjecting 
government to a mode of distributive or minority control in order to balance 
the electorally established mode of collective or majority control.”200 The most 
obvious solution is a procedure that would enable minorities to question public 
decisions on the basis of their perceived interests, and to trigger a review in an 
impartial forum where all “relevant interests are taken equally into account and 
only impartially supported decisions are upheld.”201 The contestatory 
dimension of democracy provides citizens with the power to challenge public 
decisions on the grounds that their interests and perspectives were not 
adequately taken into account during the decision-making process, and that the 
resulting decision was therefore arbitrary.202 The underlying assumption is that 
the final decision would have been different if such interests were given equal 
consideration.203 Pettit claims that the electoral dimension of democracy 
promotes legitimacy by ensuring that governmental decisions originate, 
“however indirectly, in the collective will of the people.”204 Significantly, 
however, the contestatory dimension of democracy further improves the 
legitimacy of those decisions to the extent that they can withstand challenges 
brought by individuals “in forums and under procedures that are acceptable to 
all concerned.”205 Whereas the electoral mode of democracy “gives the 
collective people an indirect power of authorship over the laws,” the 
contestatory mode of democracy “would give the people, considered 
individually, a limited and, of course, indirect power of editorship over those 
laws.”206 
I have recently argued that Pettit’s theory of republican democracy, and the 
related insights of deliberative democratic theory, have a remarkable ability to 
explain the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary’s role in statutory 
interpretation in the modern regulatory state.207 In a nutshell, Congress is 
authorized by the Constitution to play the primary authorial role in the 
lawmaking process,208 and this is entirely legitimate because of the electoral 
 
199 Pettit, supra note 29, at 178.  
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 179.  
202 See id. at 180. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. (emphasis added).  
207 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 240; Staszewski, supra note 113, at 465-76 (applying 
this theory to the interpretation of successful ballot measures).  
208 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
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dimension of democracy.209 It follows that when Congress has explicitly 
resolved a legal or policy question in a reasoned fashion, administrative 
agencies and courts are obligated to respect the legislature’s decision.  
The corollary of this view of legislative supremacy, however, is that when 
Congress has not explicitly resolved a particular legal or policy question in a 
reasoned fashion during the lawmaking process, the best way to avoid the 
potential for arbitrary domination is for the public officials who implement the 
law to engage in reasoned deliberation regarding the best course of action on 
the merits under the circumstances.210 In the modern regulatory state, 
responsibility for resolving these statutory ambiguities will ordinarily fall, as 
an initial matter, on an administrative agency with delegated authority to carry 
out the purposes of the federal programs established by Congress.211 When an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is subsequently challenged in courts, the 
judiciary plays an “editorial role” and examines whether the agency has made 
a reasoned decision.212 If so, the agency’s decision should be upheld; if not, it 
should be vacated and remanded for further consideration (and potential 
revision). When there is no agency responsible for implementing a statute (or 
the responsible agency has not taken a reasoned position on the matter), and 
Congress has not explicitly resolved the question, the judiciary will necessarily 
play a more robust editorial role when the proper understanding of a statute is 
contested. The people are thereby provided with a variety of different forums 
for potentially contesting legal or policy issues, and individuals cannot be 
adversely affected by governmental action unless a reasoned decision that 
considered their interests and perspectives was provided at some point in the 
legal process. 
For present purposes, the central point is that the public officials who 
implement the law will necessarily have substantial policymaking discretion 
when Congress has not explicitly resolved an issue during the legislative 
process.213 This is highly problematic under the traditional, liberal theory of 
democratic legitimacy in statutory interpretation, which maintains that 
unelected administrators and judges should serve as the legislature’s faithful 
agents and “carry out decisions they do not make.”214 The exercise of 
policymaking discretion is significantly less troubling, however, if the purpose 
of democracy is to promote freedom as non-domination, and there are 
structural safeguards in place to prevent the possibility of domination by the 
state. From this perspective, courts affirmatively promote republican 
 
209 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 249. 
210 Id. at 253.  
211 Id.; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A 
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502-03 
(2005). 
212 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 229.  
213 Id. at 253-54.  
214 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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democracy when they engage in hard-look judicial review of agency action or 
otherwise provide individuals or groups with a meaningful opportunity to 
contest a statute’s application to their conduct. 
B. The Value of Practical Reasoning and Diversity 
The proposals for dumbing down statutory interpretation seek to promote 
greater clarity and predictability in the interpretive enterprise, and thereby to 
promote the rule of law as a law of rules.215 No one doubts that agencies and 
courts are obligated to respect Congress’s policy choices when it has explicitly 
resolved the precise question at issue in a reasoned fashion during the 
legislative process. Nonetheless, scholars and judges tend to have different 
conceptions of statutory ambiguity and different approaches for assessing 
whether it exists,216 and they often part ways on the best course of action when 
a statute is deemed ambiguous or unanticipated problems arise. 
The trend is for commentators to advocate relatively simple and uniform 
formulas for ascertaining the meaning of the law in any particular case, which 
typically include some combination of (1) simple, clear, and consistent rules 
for identifying and enforcing unambiguous statutory mandates; (2) simple, 
clear, and consistent rules for resolving statutory ambiguity; and (3) simple, 
clear, and consistent hierarchical frameworks for proceeding through the 
various stages of the analysis in statutory cases.217 Thus, for example, 
Professors Bruhl and Vermeule essentially propose (1) following the surface 
meaning of clear textual provisions, or (2) deferring to administrative 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory mandates.218 Similarly, Gluck admires 
the binding three-step framework that was adopted by the Oregon Supreme 
Court as a matter of stare decisis, which (1) seeks to ascertain the plain 
meaning of the statutory text in its semantic context; (2) examines the 
legislative history of the statute if the intent of the legislature remains unclear; 
and (3) resolves any remaining ambiguities by resorting to “general maxims of 
statutory construction.”219 Justice Scalia’s proposed methodology for reading 
law provides a set of allegedly valid rules that is designed to ascertain the 
“plain meaning” of the text and thereby limit the scope of statutory 
ambiguity,220 which he would resolve, when necessary, by following prior 
 
215 See supra Part II.B.  
216 See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry 
Into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 258-59 (2010) (“This ambiguity about 
ambiguity is latent; courts generally talk about whether a statute is ambiguous without 
making clear whether they are making internal or external judgments.”); John F. Manning, 
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 
217 See supra Part I. 
218 See supra Parts I.C-I.D. 
219 Gluck, supra note 8, at 1777 (quoting Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and 
Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Or. 1993)).  
220 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
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judicial precedent, seeking to carry out the statutory purpose, or by deferring to 
an authoritative interpretation by an administrative agency.221 
Perhaps most important for present purposes, all of these approaches would 
effectively compel courts to “eschew[] the use of other tools to enrich their 
sense of meaning, intentions, or purposes,”222 and they would generally forbid 
judges from considering the policy implications of their decisions or how 
things have changed since a statute was enacted. While regulatory agencies 
could presumably take these policy-oriented considerations into account in 
reaching their decisions on the best way to implement a statute, the advocates 
of some of these proposals maintain that the judiciary should not second-guess 
those decisions based on the superior political accountability and expertise of 
administrators.223 Hence, they seemingly reject the use of hard-look judicial 
review to evaluate the validity of an agency’s resolution of statutory 
ambiguity. In short, these proposals essentially boil down to (1) finding the 
answer that was put into the statute by Congress, largely through the use of 
textual analysis, and (2) resolving any latent ambiguity by deferring to the 
policy choices of agencies. The proposals, by design, leave virtually no 
independent policymaking or checking function (or, in other words, no 
editorial role) for the federal judiciary. As a result, they effectively strip 
statutory interpretation of its capacity to serve as a mechanism of contestatory 
democracy, except when agencies unambiguously exceed the scope of their 
statutory authority. 
My proposed vision of statutory interpretation recognizes that the 
advantages of rule-based decision-making should be respected when Congress 
has explicitly resolved an issue in a reasoned fashion during the lawmaking 
process.224 My claim, however, is that the resolution of disputes regarding the 
permissible scope of governmental authority in difficult statutory cases 
requires the use of practical reasoning, and that the quality of statutory law and 
its democratic legitimacy benefit from an ongoing, multi-institutional, systemic 
dialogue on those questions. Moreover, if statutory interpretation is to provide 
individuals and groups with opportunities to challenge the validity of 
governmental authority, and thereby avoid the possibility of domination by the 
state, interpretive litigation should be an information-rich environment that is 
open to a wide range of competing arguments and a variety of potential 
justifications for judicial decisions. 
 
DUKE L.J. 511, 521. 
221 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 230 (2012) (“For Justice Scalia himself, the answer is to follow and reason 
from Supreme Court precedent construing open-textured laws like the Sherman Act or defer 
to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes or attribute a purpose to the statute and 
construe it according to such purpose.”).  
222 VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 183.  
223 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 220, at 515; supra Parts I.C-I.D. 
224 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 252-53.  
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The animating idea is that avoiding the possibility of domination by the state 
requires public officials to consider and respond in a reasoned fashion to the 
interests and perspectives of everyone who will be significantly affected by 
coercive exercises of governmental authority. When the legislature explicitly 
resolves an issue in a reasoned fashion during the lawmaking process, we 
ordinarily assume that Congress satisfies this requirement because of the 
structural safeguards that the Constitution provides to facilitate reasoned 
deliberation.225 For this reason, agencies and courts are generally obligated to 
follow the legislature’s decisions, and the primary mechanisms for contesting 
existing law are for critics of the status quo to seek a statutory amendment or 
persuade the judiciary to declare a statute unconstitutional. 
When Congress fails to anticipate or resolve an issue during the legislative 
process, it routinely delegates the relevant policymaking authority to an 
administrative agency.226 Agencies are, in turn, relatively well-positioned to 
determine whether Congress has explicitly resolved an issue in a reasoned 
fashion during the legislative process, and, if not, which courses of action 
would be most appropriate under the circumstances.227 Agencies, of course, 
tend to have a great deal of prior experience and substantive expertise in their 
regulatory areas. They are also subject to the ongoing influence of elected 
officials through the powers of appointment and removal, the budget process, 
and various means of congressional and executive oversight. Significantly, 
administrators are frequently required to follow procedures that obligate them 
to consider and respond to the interests and perspectives of the regulated 
entities and regulatory beneficiaries that are most likely to be affected by their 
decisions, as well as the views of attentive, ordinary citizens.228 Thus, for 
example, the Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to provide 
meaningful opportunities for public notice and comment when they promulgate 
 
225 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative 
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 444 
(1998) (“We presume that the legislature will not only meet but will engage and deliberate 
with and about the relevant strangers in the public sphere and that the strangers, although 
remaining strangers and never becoming friends, will be treated with concern and respect.”); 
Staszewski, supra note 27, at 251-53 (“[T]he structural safeguards that are provided by the 
Constitution to facilitate reasoned deliberation and prevent faction help to explain the strong 
presumption of constitutionality that the judiciary routinely ascribes to legislation.”). While 
this assumption may not be true in many cases, it is widely believed that judicial 
enforcement of robust principles of “due process of lawmaking” would be unworkable. See, 
e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and 
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002) (lamenting 
the Court’s exceedingly rigorous intrusion into congressional processes). Accordingly, the 
judiciary will typically enforce the legislature’s policy decisions in the absence of a 
substantive constitutional violation. 
226 See Staszewski, supra note 27, at 254. 
227 See id. at 258-61. 
228 See id. at 261. 
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legislative rules,229 and agency interpretations of statutes are not entitled to as 
much judicial deference if they decline to provide such procedures.230 While 
there is little empirical research that rigorously examines how agencies 
interpret their enabling acts,231 it seems likely that they would typically engage 
in a process of practical reasoning, which considers a variety of relevant 
factors to make what they regard as the best decision under the circumstances 
in each particular situation.232 
Most scholars seem to agree that agencies are likely to be better statutory 
interpreters than courts for the foregoing reasons.233 Nonetheless, the 
availability of meaningful judicial review of agency decision-making is vital 
from the perspective of republican democracy for a couple of reasons. First, 
judicial review can help to ensure that agencies respect the explicit policy 
choices of the enacting Congress, and thereby honor the principle of legislative 
supremacy when a statute is subsequently implemented.234 Second, judicial 
review can help to ensure that agencies engage in reasoned decision-making, 
and that they give adequate consideration to all of the interests and 
perspectives that are expressed during the administrative process.235 Judicial 
review can therefore prevent agencies from giving short shrift to legal 
considerations, while simultaneously discouraging agencies from giving 
excessive weight to political considerations that are unrelated to the merits of 
implementing their delegated statutory authority. Agencies have plenty of 
incentives to reach decisions that comport with the preferences of powerful or 
 
229 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
230 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
231 For a recent study that addresses some aspects of this topic, see Christopher J. 
Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 703 (2014) (exploring empirically how the Court’s deference doctrine may affect 
statutory interpretation by agencies).  
232 See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 72-95 (1990) (claiming that all agency decisions have political, 
scientific, and legal dimensions that are difficult or impossible to disentangle); Jody 
Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014) 
(providing case studies of the pragmatic manner in which agencies tend to apply old statutes 
to unanticipated new problems). 
233 See Staszewski, supra note 27, at 258-61 (providing sources); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the 
Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411 
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234 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining 
Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial 
Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1279-80 (2002). 
235 See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative 
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 885-93 (2012) (explaining that hard-look judicial review 
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influential political actors, and their decision-making therefore naturally 
accords with the electoral dimension of democracy.236 The regulatory state also 
needs to provide mechanisms of contestatory democracy that protect political 
minorities from the possibility of domination by the state. Procedural 
safeguards, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, are an important part of 
the solution, but there is also a need for judicial review of agency action under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.237 
The fact that judicial review of agency action provides a mechanism of 
contestatory democracy, which promotes legislative supremacy and improves 
the democratic legitimacy of agency lawmaking, does not mean that courts 
should not give deference to the reasonable policy choices of administrators. 
Rather, I have previously argued that in assessing whether Congress has 
explicitly resolved the precise question at issue during the legislative process, 
courts should give an appropriate degree of respect to an agency’s assessment 
of the unambiguous meaning of a statute.238 When a court determines that 
Congress has not considered or resolved the precise question at issue, it should 
uphold the agency’s policy decision if the agency has adequately considered 
and responded to the information and views expressed in the administrative 
record, and thereby engaged in reasoned deliberation. This form of judicial 
review, which is relatively pragmatic and deferential in nature, differs 
substantially from the “rubber-stamp” that Vermeule and Scalia would 
seemingly extend to agency action. It also responds to the fundamental concern 
that “if federal courts decline to provide meaningful judicial review of the 
resolution of statutory ambiguities by regulatory agencies, the executive 
branch would acquire too much unrestrained lawmaking power, and agencies 
could therefore arbitrarily dominate the people.”239 
 
236 See id. at 853. 
237 See Staszewski, supra note 27, at 261-68. 
238 Id. at 264, 267; see also Michael Herz, Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Outside of 
the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AGENCIES 125, 142-43 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (“Skidmore deference 
comes into play in two separate settings, not always carefully distinguished. First, outside 
Chevron’s domain, Skidmore holds sway. Second, even within Chevron’s domain, Skidmore 
deference should apply within step one.”); Eskridge, supra note 233, at 448-50 (claiming 
that federal courts should give Skidmore deference to an agency’s resolution of questions of 
law under the first step of Chevron). 
239 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 267-68; see also Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation 
Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 121 
(2011) (“Congress may enact legislation entrusting lawmaking authority to administrative 
agencies as long as it constrains administrative decisionmaking substantively, procedurally, 
and structurally in such a way that delegation does not engender domination by manifestly 
increasing the government’s capacity for arbitrariness.”); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 
(1989) (emphasizing the role of the judiciary as a check on the executive power of 
agencies); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that most policy decisions in the regulatory 
state should ultimately be the products of reasoned decisions by Congress or an 
administrative agency. Sometimes, however, federal courts will be called upon 
to interpret statutes when neither Congress nor an administrative agency has 
engaged in reasoned deliberation on the question. This could be the case 
because Congress failed to foresee an issue or was unwilling or unable 
definitively to resolve the matter, and because Congress either did not delegate 
formal lawmaking authority to an administrative agency or an agency with 
such authority did not use the requisite lawmaking procedures. In such cases, 
federal courts will necessarily be performing a lawmaking or policymaking 
function, and they should do so by engaging in reasoned deliberation on the 
best course of action under the circumstances. 
This is another major way in which my proposed understanding of the 
judiciary’s role in statutory interpretation differs most sharply from the 
proposals for simplification and uniformity. Rather than adopting a single set 
of rules that would artificially minimize statutory ambiguity, “eschew the use 
of tools that could enrich the judiciary’s sense of Congress’s meaning, 
intentions, or purposes,”240 or forbid courts from openly considering the policy 
implications of their decisions or how things have changed since a statute was 
enacted, we should encourage courts to consider all of the information that 
could be relevant to making the best possible decision in each case. Perhaps 
most important, we should also expect courts to be responsive to the arguments 
presented by the parties and to give reasoned explanations for their decisions. 
The whole point of statutory interpretation from this perspective is to give 
individuals or groups an opportunity to challenge public decisions in an 
impartial forum on the grounds that their interests or perspectives were not 
taken into account during the decision-making process, and the consideration 
of those views allegedly warrants a decision in their favor. The imposition of 
legal restrictions on the information or arguments that could be presented by 
the parties or relied upon by the courts would therefore defeat the purpose of 
the enterprise and deprive judicial lawmaking or policymaking of its 
democratic legitimacy in this context. 
Professors Eskridge and Frickey have provided the classic model of 
practical reasoning in statutory interpretation,241 and I have previously 
explained how a deliberative and pragmatic approach should inform the 
judiciary’s editorial role from the perspective of statutory interpretation as 
 
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 68 (2000) (“[S]o long as judges retain authority to interpret law—whether that 
law be in the form of congressional statutes or administrative regulations—the judiciary 
would continue to play its original role of inducing lawmakers to anticipate judicial reaction, 
to internalize judicial values, and to engage in careful deliberation and drafting.”). 
240 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
241 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 30, at 365.  
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contestatory democracy.242 Federal courts will undoubtedly disagree about how 
statutes should be interpreted in some hard cases under this approach, because 
judges will have different perspectives about the best course of action on the 
merits under the circumstances. The judicial discretion that is inherent in this 
approach should be understood, however, as a feature rather than a bug of the 
interpretive enterprise.243 
If there were only one way of interpreting statutes, dictated either by the 
Constitution or a binding set of codified rules, courts would have much less 
leeway to decide which sources of interpretive guidance should receive the 
greatest weight in any particular case. Since each of the leading foundational 
theories emphasizes information that is valuable for different reasons, none of 
those approaches will be appropriate in every situation. For example, 
textualism does not provide a single correct answer when the statutory text is 
ambiguous or when the plain meaning of a statute would lead to highly 
problematic results that were not anticipated by the legislature. Similarly, 
intentionalism cannot resolve a case when the lawmakers did not anticipate or 
resolve the problem that arises during adjudication. Meanwhile, purposivism is 
not especially helpful when a statute promotes competing purposes or when a 
court must decide how far Congress went in achieving a statute’s underlying 
goals and the statute does not provide ascertainable limiting principles. 
Moreover, many cases present conflicts among the different considerations 
emphasized by the competing foundational theories, or between the results that 
would ordinarily be dictated by the straightforward use of those methods and 
other widely accepted values. Finally, there are some hard cases where none of 
the foundational theories provides a clear answer to the interpretive problem 
and other public values must dictate the result. The choice of interpretive 
methodology in hard cases necessarily goes hand-in-hand with the judiciary’s 
assessment of the best decision under the circumstances. Any ex ante effort to 
specify a single interpretive methodology would, if consistently followed, (1) 
force the judiciary to disregard relevant interests or perspectives and reach 
what it perceives as the wrong decision in some hard cases; (2) leave courts 
without the tools necessary to reach any sensible decision in certain cases; or 
(3) preclude courts from being candid about the true rationales for some of 
their decisions. This effort would therefore facilitate the possibility of arbitrary 
domination by the state. 
The fact that different judges may disagree and reach inconsistent outcomes 
in some hard cases is not a significant problem for several related reasons. 
First, most hard cases do not have a single correct answer, and it does not 
 
242 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 262-78. 
243 See Leib & Serota, supra note 31; see also Solan, supra note 11, at 747 (claiming that 
“it will never be possible to come up with a hierarchy that will rank all of the [legitimate] 
considerations in such a way as to have the ranking apply across a broad range of cases . . . 
because various factors can be stronger or weaker from case to case and judges require 
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promote democracy to pretend otherwise or to adopt a mechanical formula for 
resolving statutory disputes that precludes consideration of potentially 
persuasive information. Second, the traditional principles of statutory 
interpretation that courts use when they engage in practical reasoning provide 
meaningful constraints that limit the scope of judicial discretion and cabin the 
range of plausible outcomes.244 The judiciary plays an editorial role in 
statutory interpretation; it is not the primary lawmaker from this perspective. 
Third, judicial decisions under this approach should be relatively minimalistic, 
incremental, dynamic, and provisional245—which means that they could 
potentially be distinguished in subsequent cases based on new information, 
reconsidered based on new information or arguments from a regulatory agency 
that subsequently engaged in reasoned deliberation on the matter,246 or 
overruled by Congress pursuant to a statutory amendment if there was 
sufficient consensus in favor of a different course of action. Finally, diverse 
judicial perspectives and interpretive methodologies promote a dialogue within 
the federal judicial system on the best way of handling difficult statutory 
questions both in particular cases and as a more general matter. This diversity 
also helps to facilitate a broader, multi-institutional, systemic dialogue about 
the best resolution of contested policy issues, thereby improving the modern 
regulatory state’s democratic legitimacy. Both aspects of this dialogue would 
be severely hampered by the dumbing down of statutory interpretation, 
because there would be much less forthright or reflective discussion of the 
merits of various policy alternatives. 
C. The Modern Legal Hierarchy in the Regulatory State 
The proponents of the proposals at issue adhere to the traditional hierarchy 
of legal sources, and they seem to assume that these sources of law are 
exclusive.247 Accordingly, they either contend that their preferred interpretive 
methodology is constitutionally mandated, or that interpretive principles are 
judicially created common law, which should be treated as precedential unless 
overridden by Congress.248 My claim is that the traditional hierarchy of legal 
sources is outdated in the modern regulatory state, and that “interpretive 
methodology” and “agency decision-making” should be recognized as distinct 
forms of law in the following new legal hierarchy: (1) Constitution, (2) 
interpretive methodology, (3) statutes, (4) agency action,249 and (5) common 
 
244 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 30, at 380-83. 
245 See Staszewski, supra note 27, at 273. 
246 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in 
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1276 (2002). 
247 See supra Part II.C. 
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249 This discussion focuses primarily on the place of interpretive methodology in a new 
legal hierarchy for the regulatory state. I plan to address the legal status of various types of 
agency action and develop this proposed legal hierarchy more fully in a subsequent project. 
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law. Moreover, unlike traditional sources of law, which are generally viewed 
as fixed,250 these “new” forms of law are, by definition, provisional. 
Accordingly, Congress cannot dictate binding rules of statutory interpretation 
to the judiciary, and one court cannot ordinarily dictate the interpretive 
methodology of its successors. 
While a full reconsideration of the nature and sources of “law” is a much 
larger project than I can accomplish here, I wish to offer a descriptive 
hypothesis and a normative thesis. The descriptive hypothesis is that 
interpretive methodology is influenced by the Constitution and the meta-intent 
of Congress, but it generally cannot be controlled by those sources. Moreover, 
courts generally believe that they are bound by constitutional limits on their 
interpretive discretion, and that Congress cannot dictate how the judiciary 
interprets statutes. Accordingly, interpretive methodology falls in between the 
Constitution and statutes as a source of law in the modern regulatory state. The 
normative thesis is that viewing interpretive methodology as a provisional 
source of law, which is influenced from the top by the Constitution and from 
the bottom by Congress’s meta-intent, is an attractive way of thinking about 
the interpretive enterprise and the broader nature of law. This is partly the case 
because the current treatment of interpretive methodology helps to facilitate 
the ongoing, systemic dialogue about the best ways of solving difficult social 
problems that is discussed above, and it is therefore an important part of what 
keeps the law purposive, dynamic, and equitable. This understanding of 
interpretive methodology helps to avoid some of the shortcomings of an 
unduly strict attachment to “legalism,”251 and it suggests that our legal ethos 
includes commitments to reasoned deliberation, contestatory democracy, and 
freedom from the possibility of domination.252 This section concludes by 
drawing upon the work of legendary law and society scholars Philippe Nonet 
and Philip Selznick to distinguish my proposed view of law from the apparent 
vision of the advocates of dumbing down statutory interpretation.253 In short, 
they want to transform interpretive methodology into a more primitive form of 
“autonomous law,” whereas my approach values the interpretive process’s 
capacity to make the law more responsive. 
 
250 Common law precedent can, of course, be distinguished or overruled, but courts are 
obligated by stare decisis to follow binding precedent that is on point, unless previous 
decisions are overruled. Similarly, constitutions and statutes can be amended, but doing so is 
often quite difficult as a practical matter. Accordingly, the traditional sources of law are 
fixed in the sense that they do not ordinarily change from case to case. 
251 See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (2d ed. 
1986).  
252 Cf. Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119 (2003) (claiming that 
the prevailing legal ethos also includes a fundamental commitment to preserving peace and 
providing security). 
253 PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978). 
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 1. The Descriptive Hypothesis 
My descriptive hypothesis is relatively simple, and it is amply supported by 
the existing literature on statutory interpretation. The first part of the claim is 
that statutory interpretation is influenced by the Constitution.254 This is 
illustrated most clearly by substantive canons of statutory interpretation, which 
are typically designed to promote constitutional norms that are not fully 
enforced for institutional reasons when federal courts engage directly in 
judicial review.255 Scholars have recognized that numerous substantive canons 
perform this function, including the rule of lenity,256 the avoidance canon,257 
various federalism canons,258 non-delegation canons,259 and the absurdity 
doctrine.260 These canons are also understood to facilitate reasoned 
deliberation by elected officials on sensitive issues when legislation might 
otherwise be interpreted to push the constitutional envelope in ways that 
Congress may not have carefully considered.261 The Constitution’s influence 
on statutory interpretation is also illustrated by the heated debate over the 
appropriate use of legislative history. Leading textualists, such as Justice 
Scalia, have argued that the use of legislative history to ascertain Congress’s 
intent conflicts with the Constitution,262 while other commentators have 
suggested that ignoring legislative history would be in tension with a 
constitutional structure that is self-consciously designed to facilitate reasoned 
deliberation by lawmakers.263 Most broadly, the Constitution’s influence on 
statutory interpretation is illustrated by the fact that the leading foundational 
 
254 See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a Republic of Statutes, 2010 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 837, 862-65 (describing various ways in which statutory interpretation is 
influenced by the Constitution). 
255 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992); see also 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).  
256 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 255, at 600-01.  
257 See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, 
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 397 (2005). 
258 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 255, at 619-30.  
259 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).  
260 See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1028-46 (2009). 
261 See Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 36, at 1587-88. 
262 See supra notes 155157 and accompanying text.  
263 See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public 
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999) (arguing that 
courts should use legislative history in order to encourage the legislature to fulfill its 
obligation to publicly justify its statutes); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: 
Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1998). 
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theories—which include textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism—can all 
be understood to promote different constitutional values in different ways.264 
At the same time, the constitutional norms that are promoted by statutory 
interpretation are generally pitched at too high of a level of abstraction to 
mandate the use of any particular interpretive methods. Professors Bruhl and 
Vermeule have therefore persuasively argued that, except for some restraints 
on potentially egregious judicial behavior at the margins, the Constitution 
simply does not resolve the major disagreements that exist regarding how 
statutes should be interpreted.265 Accordingly, it seems fair to say that 
interpretive methodology is influenced by the Constitution, but that it cannot be 
controlled by the Constitution as a general matter. 
The second part of my descriptive hypothesis is that interpretive 
methodology is influenced by the meta-intent of Congress. Thus, courts 
frequently claim that their chosen methods of statutory interpretation are 
consistent with Congress’s intent regarding how federal statutes should be 
interpreted.266 Because courts have historically had very little information 
about Congress’s interpretive preferences,267 it is widely recognized that most 
of these claims are best understood as legal fictions. Nonetheless, there is 
apparently widespread consensus that Congress’s views on statutory 
interpretation matter, even if those views are generally difficult to ascertain 
with reliability or precision. At the same time, however, when legislatures have 
adopted codified rules of statutory interpretation, and thereby affirmatively 
expressed their meta-intentions on interpretive methodology, the judiciary has 
generally ignored or declined to follow those instructions.268 This could be the 
case, in part, because one legislature’s meta-intent regarding interpretive 
 
264 See Leib & Serota, supra note 31, at 52. 
265 VERMEULE, supra note 14, at 29-34, 75-76; Bruhl, supra note 13, at 444-47 & n.23; 
supra notes 83, 158-60, 165 and accompanying text. 
266 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 912-16 (2013).  
267 For recent empirical studies of this issue, see id.; Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. 
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 575 (2002). 
268 See Gluck, supra note 8, at 1786 (“The state cases indicate that courts will find ways 
around legislated methodological rules they do not like, and that judges may be unwilling to 
relinquish authority over interpretive methodology.”); Romero, supra note 46, at 241-43 
(recognizing the tendency of courts to “ignore” interpretive instructions from the 
legislature); see also Amy Widman, Interpretive Independence: The Irrelevance of Selection 
and Retention Methods to State Statutory Interpretation (unpublished manuscript) (available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464302) (July 9, 2014) (providing 
empirical support for the proposition that state courts do not consistently follow codified 
rules of statutory interpretation, and finding that this conclusion holds true regardless of the 
subject matter of the cases, the contents of the interpretive code, or how the judges were 
appointed). 
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methodology could conflict with another legislature’s substantive intent 
regarding the application of a particular statute, and it is almost universally 
accepted that the specific trumps the general in the case of two conflicting 
statutory mandates.269 This could also be the case because most codified rules 
of statutory interpretation are too general to have much practical impact.270 
This is also likely to be the case, however, because many judges do not believe 
that the legislature can legitimately tell them how to interpret statutes, 
especially when an interpretive code would force them to reach results that 
they view as erroneous or in conflict with other public values.271 Thus, it also 
seems fair to say that interpretive methodology is influenced by Congress’s 
meta-intent regarding statutory interpretation, but it cannot be controlled by 
Congress’s meta-intent as a general matter. Moreover, since courts generally 
appear to believe that they are bound by constitutional limits on their 
interpretive discretion and that Congress cannot dictate how they interpret 
statutes, interpretive methodology falls in between the Constitution and 
statutes as a source of law in the modern regulatory state. Finally, it bears 
reiterating that because federal courts do not give stare decisis effect to the 
interpretive methodology that was used to decide prior cases, interpretive 
methodology is distinct from the common law and other traditional legal 
sources insofar as “the law” changes from case-to-case and is therefore 
relatively provisional. 
 2. The Normative Thesis 
My normative thesis is that viewing interpretive methodology as a 
provisional source of law that is influenced from the top by the Constitution 
and from the bottom by Congress’s meta-intent, but that is not tightly 
controlled by either of those sources, is an attractive way of thinking about the 
interpretive enterprise and the broader nature of law. The previous section 
explained that if there was only one way of interpreting statutes, which was 
 
269 See Andrew Tutt, Comment, Interpretation Step Zero: A Limit on Methodology as 
“Law,” 122 YALE L.J. 2055, 2059-61 (2013). 
270 See id. at 2055; Romero, supra note 46, at 217.  
271 See, e.g., Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 786 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) 
(“[I]nterpretation statutes that ‘seek[] to control the attitude or the subjective thoughts of the 
judiciary’ violate the separation of powers doctrine.” (quoting James C. Thomas, Statutory 
Construction When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 191, 211 
n.85 (1966))); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 243-46 (discussing the “interesting 
question” of “how far a legislature can go in prescribing how the courts interpret,” claiming 
that the question “is for the most part academic,” but suggesting that “[a]n interpretive 
command applicable to all statutes” is potentially problematic because it may be “an 
intrusion upon the courts’ function of interpreting the laws, rather than an exercise of the 
legislature’s power to clarify the meaning of its product”); see also Linda D. Jellum, “Which 
is to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate 
Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837 (2009); Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, Interpretive 
Freedom: A Necessary Component of Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651 (2011). 
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either dictated by the Constitution or by a binding set of codified rules, courts 
would have much less leeway to decide which sources of interpretive guidance 
should receive the greatest weight in any particular case. This would interfere 
with their ability to reach what they regard as the best decision in each case 
and would likely inhibit judicial candor. 
In contrast, an approach that allows the judiciary to engage in practical 
reasoning about the best course of action on the merits under the circumstances 
facilitates reasoned decision-making by the state. As explained above, courts 
are obligated to respect Congress’s policy decisions when the legislature has 
explicitly resolved the precise question at issue during the lawmaking process. 
Moreover, courts should defer to an agency’s resolution of statutory ambiguity 
if the agency has engaged in reasoned decision-making on the matter. If neither 
Congress nor an agency has explicitly resolved the precise question at issue in 
a reasoned fashion, however, this task necessarily falls to the judiciary.272 
Federal courts should, in turn, be free to make what they regard as the best 
decisions on the merits under the circumstances, and they should be expected 
to justify their decisions with reasons that correspond with the accompanying 
interpretive methodology. Congress can, of course, overturn a judicial decision 
by a statutory amendment, and agencies may engage in further deliberation on 
the matter, which could subsequently persuade the judiciary to change its 
position. Because interpretive methodology goes hand-in-hand with the 
judiciary’s explanation for its decision in hard cases, the flexibility that is 
provided by existing law helps the judiciary reach sound decisions in particular 
cases and facilitates an ongoing, multi-institutional dialogue about the best 
ways of solving our most difficult collective problems. Interpretive 
methodology is therefore an important part of what keeps the law purposive, 
dynamic, and equitable. At the same time, however, constitutional principles 
and Congress’s likely meta-intent influence statutory interpretation, and those 
considerations therefore combine with legal culture to provide meaningful 
constraints on the judiciary’s discretion in statutory interpretation, even if they 
cannot control the precise methodology that is used or the result that is reached 
by courts in hard cases. 
From a broader jurisprudential perspective, this understanding of 
interpretive methodology helps to alleviate some of the shortcomings of an 
unduly strict attachment to “legalism,” and it suggests that our “legal ethos” 
also includes commitments to reasoned deliberation, contestatory democracy, 
and freedom from the possibility of domination. Judith Shklar argued that an 
ideological commitment to “legalism” is what unites the legal profession, and 
she defined legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a 
matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights 
determined by rules.”273 Accordingly, “being a lawyer means that one is 
 
272 See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text; see also Staszewski, supra note 27, 
at 269, 297. 
273 SHKLAR, supra note 251, at 1. 
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committed to the ideological proposition that moral conduct is a matter of 
following rules.”274 In other words, “legalism” is a commitment to following 
rules for the sake of following rules. Shklar argued that legalism is common to 
both natural law theories of jurisprudence and legal positivism, and that it 
commits lawyers to the formalist position that all questions posed by 
conflicting rights and duties are fully determined by existing law.275 “Law, 
then, in the empire of legalism, has a static, given, autonomous, seamless, and 
complete nature, not only for formalists, who hold this thesis quite explicitly, 
but in some fashion, for virtually all lawyers.”276 Because the rules that 
determine existing legal rights and duties were, by definition, established in the 
past, “legalism, and hence the profession that defines itself by reference to it, 
has a distinctively and unmistakably conservative hue.”277 
While Professor Shklar was profoundly critical of legalism and the ideology 
that it represents, the important point for present purposes is that the proposals 
to dumb down statutory interpretation exemplify this legalistic attitude. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the advocates of some of the proposals are clearly 
more concerned with establishing binding rules of statutory interpretation than 
they are with the content of those rules. Moreover, all of the proposals are 
designed to make statutory interpretation more rule-oriented and to limit or 
preclude the exercise of judicial discretion or policymaking judgment. The 
proponents of the proposals suggest that the absence of binding rules makes 
statutory interpretation “lawless,” and they aim to rectify this situation by 
telling federal courts precisely how to interpret statutes in every subsequent 
case. Federal courts would thereby become duty-bound to follow a consistent 
and predictable interpretive methodology, and moral quandaries would no 
longer arise in statutory interpretation. Instead, the rules of statutory 
interpretation would have “a static, given, autonomous, seamless, and complete 
nature,” and the questions posed by conflicting rights and duties in difficult 
statutory cases could be fully determined by established law.278 
Robin West has persuasively argued that legalism accurately captures a 
defining element of American legal culture, but that our legal ethos also 
includes other important values, such as a commitment to preserving peace and 
promoting personal security to avoid the situation that would obtain in a state 
of nature.279 She points out that the goal of law is “not only to encourage or 
force rule-compliant behavior,” but also “to create the conditions for a higher 
quality of life than could be had in the absence of law,” and that law is 
therefore necessary to prevent “the exploitation of vulnerability and the abuse 
 
274 West, supra note 252, at 119; see also id. at 119-25 (summarizing Shklar’s 
arguments). 
275 See id. at 120.  
276 Id. 
277 Id.  
278 Id. 
279 See id. at 149-52.  
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of private power as an impediment to the enjoyment of social and civilized 
life.”280  
While West was writing from the perspective of liberal political theory, 
there is no mistaking the similarity between her vision of law and Pettit’s 
theory of republican democracy, which focuses on the need to protect citizens 
from the possibility of domination by private actors or the state.281 The central 
insight that can be derived from their work is that law and democracy both 
exist to protect the freedom of individuals or groups from the possibility of 
arbitrary exercises of power by private citizens or public officials. My claim is 
that the federal judiciary’s current treatment of interpretive methodology 
serves precisely this goal by providing meaningful opportunities for 
contestatory democracy, and that the use of practical reasoning to resolve 
interpretive disputes also promotes the intimately related value of reasoned 
deliberation. This suggests that non-domination, contestatory democracy, and 
reasoned deliberation are all important aspects of our legal ethos. It also 
suggests that the current practice of resolving interpretive disputes through the 
use of practical reasoning is entirely consistent with widely held and 
normatively attractive visions of the rule of law. 
 3. Autonomous Versus Responsive Law 
The “legalism” that is implicitly promoted by the reform proposals at issue, 
and my proposed understanding of interpretive methodology—which embraces 
additional values and commitments—are plainly based on very different 
conceptions of the rule of law. Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick have 
identified three paradigmatic stages of the rule of law, which they viewed in 
evolutionary terms.282 The first stage is repressive law, whereby the state seeks 
to establish order and consolidate its authority over society.283 “In this model 
law is the command of a sovereign who possesses, in principle, unlimited 
discretion; law and the state are inseparable.”284 Nonet and Selznick claim that 
the use of public authority “is repressive when it gives short shrift to the 
interests of the governed, that is, when it is disposed to disregard those 
interests or deny their legitimacy.”285 When governing power is used in this 
fashion, “the position of the subject is precarious and vulnerable.”286 A 
 
280 Id. at 149-50.  
281 See supra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.  
282 NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 253, at 18. They emphasize, however, that the later 
stages of law are not necessarily better than prior stages, and that a normative evaluation of 
a legal system would depend on the social context. Id. at 25-27.  
283 Id. at 29-52. 
284 Id. at 17.  
285 Id. at 29. 
286 Id.  
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repressive regime is therefore “one that puts all interests in jeopardy, and 
especially those not protected by an existing system of privilege and power.”287  
Nonetheless, repression need not be all-encompassing or the result of a 
malevolent intent. Rather, it also occurs “where power is benign but takes little 
note of, and is not effectively restrained by, affected interests.”288 A repressive 
system of law tends to be manifested by “a close integration of law and 
politics, in the form of a direct subordination of legal institutions to public and 
private governing elites: law is a pliable tool, readily available to consolidate 
power, husband authority, secure privilege, and win conformity.”289 Moreover, 
repressive law tends to be characterized by “rampant official discretion, which 
is at once an outcome and a chief guarantee of the law’s pliability.”290 In other 
words, repressive law forces citizens to follow the dictates of the state, and the 
state has no obligation to consider the interests or perspectives of ordinary 
citizens or to follow consistent rules. 
In ordinary circumstances, repressive law does not have many fans, since it 
does not comport with widespread conceptions of either law or democracy. 
The second stage of the rule of law identified by Nonet and Selznick aims to 
remedy the “legal” deficiencies of repressive law, and ultimately matches up 
rather closely with Shklar’s conception of “legalism” and most traditional 
theories of the rule of law. This view, which Nonet and Selznick characterize 
as autonomous law, is a potential mechanism “for taming repression” and 
establishing “a government of laws and not of men.”291 The rule of law is 
established under this model “when legal institutions acquire enough 
independent authority to impose standards of restraint on the exercise of 
governmental power.”292 An autonomous legal system is characterized by “the 
formation of specialized, relatively autonomous legal institutions that claim a 
qualified supremacy within defined spheres of competence.”293 Nonet and 
Selznick describe the chief attributes of autonomous law as follows: 
Law is separated from politics. Characteristically, the system proclaims 
the independence of the judiciary and draws a sharp line between 
legislative and judicial functions. 
The legal order espouses the “model of rules.” A focus on rules helps 
enforce a measure of official accountability; at the same time, it limits 
both the creativity of legal institutions and the risk of their intrusion into 
the political domain. 
 
287 Id. at 30.  
288 Id. at 31. 
289 Id. at 51. 
290 Id.  
291 Id. at 53 (employing the language of MASS. CONST. art. XXX).  
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“Procedure is the heart of law.” Regularity and fairness, not substantive 
justice, are the first ends and the main competence of the legal order. 
“Fidelity to law” is understood as strict obedience to the rules of positive 
law. Criticism of existing laws must be channeled through the political 
process.294 
Nonet and Selznick recognize that a “close accountability to rules” is the 
chief advantage of autonomous law, and that “legalism is its affliction.”295 
They explain that a narrow focus on rules tends to limit “the range of legally 
relevant facts, thereby detaching legal thought from social reality.”296 Legalism 
privileges legal authority “to the detriment of practical problem solving,” as 
“[t]he application of rules ceases to be informed by a regard for purposes, 
needs, and consequences.”297 This is costly “because of the rigidities” that are 
imposed by legalism, “but also because rules construed in abstracto are too 
easily satisfied by a formal observance that conceals substantive evasions of 
public policy.”298 Nonet and Selznick recognize that the shortcomings of 
legalism provide structural incentives for citizens to criticize the operation of 
autonomous law, and that this creates an environment that is conducive to 
challenges to governmental authority, which in turn provokes calls for the 
recognition of legal rights and increased flexibility or equity in interpretive 
litigation.299 “The long-term effect is to build into the legal order a dynamic of 
change, and to generate expectations that law respond flexibly to new 
problems and demands.”300 Nonet and Selznick claim that from this 
development, “[a] vision emerges, and the possibility is sensed, of a responsive 
legal order, more open to social influence and more effective in dealing with 
social problems.”301 
The third stage of the rule of law is therefore responsive law,302 which 
essentially seeks to remedy the democratic shortcomings of an unduly strict 
attachment to legalism. Nonet and Selznick point out that “[t]he quest for 
responsive law has been a continuing preoccupation of modern legal 
theory,”303 beginning with legal realism and the advocates of sociological 
jurisprudence, and extending to traditional legal process theory as well as its 
more recent incarnations. The primary goal of such theories is “to make law 
more responsive to social needs,” which generally requires “a broadening of 
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the field of the legally relevant, so that legal reasoning [can] embrace 
knowledge of the social contexts and effects of official action.”304 Responsive 
theories of law tend to be receptive to increased opportunities for participation 
in the legal process and to relatively expansive notions of the role of law. Such 
theories maintain that the rule of law should extend beyond procedural justice, 
and that it should be designed to help identify the public interest, promote 
institutional competence, and achieve substantive justice. In this higher stage 
of legal development, legal institutions can be expected “to give up the insular 
safety of autonomous law and become more dynamic instruments of social 
ordering and social change.”305 
Nonet and Selznick provide a detailed analysis of the defining attributes and 
potential dangers of responsive law, which is organized around four main 
points. The first point is that responsive law is highly purposive and dynamic 
in nature and that those qualities are natural outgrowths or responses to the 
legalism of autonomous law.306 Because bright-line rules are inherently static 
and imprecise, the legal process becomes receptive to arguments for updating 
and fine-tuning those rules to better accord with their underlying purposes, 
other widely-accepted principles or values, and contemporary circumstances. 
While “[a]utonomous law recoils from the unsettling effect of purposive 
thinking,” this feature of responsive law “counteracts the tendency of officials 
to retreat behind rules and evade responsibility” for their decisions.307 The 
second point is that responsive law’s reliance on evolving purposes and 
principles provides a powerful basis for criticizing the legal status quo, and 
thereby has a tendency to undermine the received authority of rules and 
provide incentives for the use of relatively flexible or equitable approaches to 
interpretation.308 The third point is that the “openness” of responsive law 
provides increased opportunities for participation in the lawmaking process by 
a wider range of individuals and groups, and that it changes the nature of legal 
participation and results in “a wider sharing of legal authority.”309 In a 
responsive system of law, “legal action comes to serve as a vehicle by which 
groups and organizations may participate in the determination of public 
policy.”310 While responsive law rejects a sharp separation of law and politics, 
it also recognizes that the legal process is governed and constrained by legal 
authority, and that law and politics are therefore distinct. The fourth point is 
that the legal pluralism that responsive law facilitates has “both the virtues and 
the vices of openness,” and that legal institutions therefore “need effective 
 
304 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
305 Id. at 74.  
306 See id. at 78-86. 
307 Id. at 82-83. 
308 See id. at 87-94. 
309 Id. at 95; see also id. at 95-103. 
310 Id. at 96. 
  
260 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:209 
 
tutelage in the accommodation of pressure.”311 In other words, responsive law 
needs competent institutions that are capable of withstanding the characteristic 
dangers of pressure politics. Nonet and Selznick therefore emphasize the 
importance of institutional design, and they express great hope for the 
potentially productive role that could be played by administrative law and the 
modern regulatory state in helping to achieve a more responsive legal system. 
In my view, Nonet and Selznick’s work strongly suggests that interpretive 
methodology is properly considered a form of law. The real question is 
whether our legal system’s current approach to interpretive methodology 
should be retrograded to fit within the paradigm of autonomous law, or 
whether it should be allowed to continue to operate in a relatively responsive 
fashion. The proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation are literally 
reactionary because they are seeking to transform interpretive methodology 
into a less advanced form of autonomous law. In contrast, the federal 
judiciary’s current approach and my proposed understanding are better 
characterized as instantiations of responsive law because they seek to 
counteract the shortcomings of an excessive attachment to rules and promote a 
more effective and responsive legal system. The proponents of the reform 
proposals at issue are evidently concerned that the exercise of judicial 
discretion in statutory interpretation could lead to “repressive law” or tyranny. 
While Nonet and Selznick recognized that responsive law is relatively “risky,” 
and that it would not necessarily be advisable in societies with weak legal 
cultures or public institutions, it is vital to understand that there is a world of 
difference between the official use of discretion to maintain the state’s 
authority and the official use of discretion to prevent the arbitrary domination 
of its people. The latter, by definition, promotes freedom and democracy, 
whereas the former does not. 
* * * 
From a broader perspective, it bears noting that the American legal system 
contains both autonomous and responsive features. When lawmakers have 
explicitly resolved the precise question that has arisen in adjudication, the 
traditional sources of substantive law (i.e., the Constitution, statutes, and the 
common law) are thought to establish authoritative rules that provide fixed 
answers. The role of the judiciary is to implement those rules and thereby to 
respect the autonomy of the law. Nonetheless, when lawmakers have not 
explicitly resolved the precise question at issue or circumstances have 
materially changed, and the applicable law is therefore ambiguous, agencies 
and courts can and should implement or interpret the law in a responsive 
fashion. Agency action and interpretive methodology are therefore distinct 
forms of law in the modern regulatory state, and they should be recognized in 
the following new legal hierarchy: (1) Constitution, (2) interpretive 
methodology, (3) statutes, (4) agency action, and (5) common law.  
 
311 Id. at 104; see also id. at 104-13 (explaining responsive law’s advantages and 
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D. Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy 
Faithful agent theories of statutory interpretation cannot eliminate judicial 
discretion in hard cases. Instead of viewing this as a problem for democracy, 
we should recognize that the point of this form of government is to prevent the 
possibility of domination, and that statutory interpretation can affirmatively 
promote democracy when an issue has not been resolved in a reasoned fashion 
by Congress or an agency. In order to perform this function, statutory 
interpretation must take place in an information-rich environment in which 
decision-makers consider a wide range of interests and perspectives. Courts 
should be encouraged to engage in practical reasoning and expected to have 
differences of opinion. Although interpretive methodology is influenced by the 
Constitution and Congress’s intent regarding interpretive practices, it is not 
tightly controlled by those sources, and the methodology that is used by one 
court is not binding on other courts in subsequent cases. Interpretive 
methodology should be understood as a distinct form of law, which falls in 
between the Constitution and statutes in a new legal hierarchy for the 
regulatory state. This pragmatic approach to interpretive methodology helps to 
make our entire legal system more responsive. 
This theory would not make much sense, however, if the function of 
statutory interpretation were merely to ascertain the meaning of the law. That 
idea, while admittedly conventional, is based on precisely the sort of legalism 
that my vision of statutory interpretation rejects, because it falsely assumes that 
law has “a static, given, autonomous, seamless, and complete nature.”312 This 
traditional view should be discarded, and we should recognize that the central 
function of statutory interpretation by federal courts in the modern regulatory 
state is to provide individuals and groups with opportunities to contest the 
validity of particular exercises of governmental authority.313 
I have recently explained in other work that most issues of statutory 
interpretation in federal court arise in the context of challenges to the validity 
of agency action.314 One party is claiming that the government has exceeded 
the scope of its lawful authority, while the government is contending that the 
manner in which it has chosen to implement a statute is both legally 
 
312 West, supra note 252, at 120. 
313 Cf. Solan, supra note 11, at 748 (“It is not unusual to speak of a statute’s meaning, but 
determining meaning is not really the task at hand in statutory interpretation. What judges 
do in deciding statutory cases is to make a judgment about whether a law applies to the facts 
of a case and, if so, how it applies.”). For other recent discussions of the distinction between 
linguistic meaning and legal content, and the highly complex and normatively controversial 
relationship between them, see Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal 
Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei A. Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011), and 
Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479 (2013).  
314 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 227-28, 246-47.  
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permissible and reasonable as a policy matter. When a court decides such a 
case or controversy, it is resolving a “contest” over the permissible scope of 
governmental authority. Statutory interpretation in federal court is therefore 
typically a species of judicial review of agency action—and a prototypical 
example of a mechanism of contestatory democracy. Moreover, this 
conception of statutory interpretation also holds in most cases where an 
administrative agency is not involved, including litigation challenging the 
government’s understanding of criminal statutes. 
My prior work provides a detailed discussion of the respective roles of 
Congress, agencies, and courts in making and implementing law from this 
perspective,315 and I will not repeat that analysis here. Instead, I will simply 
provide a watchword for each of the respective institutions: in sum, Congress 
should be deliberative; agencies should be dynamic; and courts should be 
practical if we want to avoid arbitrary domination by the state. While the 
meaning of a statute is important and should generally be followed, a host of 
other factors will ordinarily be relevant when agencies and judges make their 
interpretive decisions, including the legislative history of the statute, its 
underlying purposes, applicable legal precedent, canons of construction, 
constitutional norms, related statutory provisions and common law principles, 
a potentially broad range of policy considerations, and how things have 
changed since a statute was enacted.316 From this perspective, neither agencies 
nor courts are “ascertaining the meaning of the law” when they interpret 
statutes in the modern regulatory state. Rather, agencies are carrying out their 
delegated authority to implement statutory programs, while courts are 
generally reviewing the legality of an agency’s decisions.317 Agencies are 
making policy decisions within the constraints provided by Congress, and the 
judiciary is providing the people with opportunities to contest the validity of 
those exercises of governmental authority.318 Requiring federal courts to 
follow a consistent and uniform set of interpretive rules, which would 
necessarily foreclose access to potentially relevant information or views, 
would undermine statutory interpretation’s central function in the modern 
regulatory state, and subject litigants to the possibility of domination in ways 
that would severely undermine democracy. 
IV. REJECTING THE TREND 
The previous Part provides a competing vision of statutory interpretation 
and the rule of law, which explains why the recent proposals to dumb down 
 
315 See id. at 249-78.  
316 Id. at 298.  
317 See Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 119 (explaining that “[n]either [the court nor the 
agency] is trying to figure out what the statute means” because “[t]he agency is making 
policy, [and] the court is ensuring that the agency has not abused its discretion in doing so”).  
318 Staszewski, supra note 27, at 298.  
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statutory interpretation are fundamentally misguided and should be rejected. 
Rather than trying to eliminate judicial discretion by adopting a simple and 
uniform approach to statutory interpretation that would be legally binding and 
external to a judge’s sense of the best way to resolve a case, I have suggested 
that courts should resolve hard cases through the use of practical reasoning. 
This pragmatic approach provides litigants with meaningful opportunities to 
contest the validity of governmental authority, and thereby allows courts to 
avoid the possibility of arbitrary domination by the state, while respecting the 
competing interests and perspectives of different litigants and judges. This 
approach improves the responsiveness of law and promotes fundamental 
principles of republican democracy. 
This Part briefly returns to each of the proposals at issue to make some 
related observations about the extent to which interpretive methodology can or 
should be simple or uniform. It closes by suggesting that provisional dialogues 
by and among different centers of power better reflect the nature of law in the 
modern regulatory state than artificial efforts to achieve simple, predictable, 
and uniform final answers to our most pressing legal or social problems. 
Unlike recent proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation, the existing 
interpretive regime correctly reflects this insight. 
A. Interpretive Guidance 
While some scholars have suggested that “the interpretation wars” could be 
ended by Congress’s enactment of federal rules of statutory interpretation, it is 
more likely that codified rules of statutory interpretation are “advisory” by 
their very nature. Most of the codified interpretive rules that have been adopted 
by American states or foreign countries explicitly state that this is the case.319 
Moreover, most interpretive codes are too general, prosaic, or eclectic to exert 
significant influence over how the judiciary decides particular statutory 
cases.320 Finally, as explained more fully below, courts generally do not, 
frequently cannot, and probably will not consistently follow codified 
interpretive rules with which they disagree. 
First, as a descriptive matter, courts do not consistently follow codified 
interpretive rules with which they disagree.321 Professor Gluck has provided 
detailed case studies of recent events in Texas and Connecticut that vividly 
illustrate this phenomenon.322 The state legislature in Texas has adopted 
codified interpretive rules that explicitly endorse an eclectic approach to 
statutory interpretation and that authorize the state judiciary to consider, among 
other things, the legislative history and purpose of a statute, even when the text 
 
319 See Romero, supra note 46, at 217 & nn.27-28 (citing examples).  
320 See id. (providing examples of states that have merely codified common law canons 
of interpretation). 
321 See generally Widman, supra note 268. 
322 Gluck, supra note 8, at 1785-97. 
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is unambiguous.323 Nonetheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals, which is the 
highest court in Texas for criminal matters, has explicitly refused to consider 
extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation in the absence of textual ambiguity, 
and has chosen instead to follow a modified textualist methodology.324 The 
Court of Criminal Appeals has justified its departure from the state interpretive 
code by claiming that legislative efforts “‘to control the attitude or the 
subjective thoughts of the judiciary’ violate the separation of powers 
doctrine.”325 Gluck reports that the Texas Supreme Court, which is the state’s 
highest court for civil matters, “is inconsistent” in its willingness to follow the 
state interpretive code, but that it “often reaches the same result [as the Court 
of Criminal Appeals], albeit more diplomatically.”326 Gluck provides other 
examples of both high courts deviating from the state interpretative code and 
examines the Fifth Circuit’s approach to diversity cases involving the 
interpretation of Texas statutes. She amusingly reports that the codified rule 
authorizing consideration of extratextual evidence in the absence of ambiguity 
“has resulted in at least three different judicial approaches: the criminal court 
(and the Fifth Circuit, generally) ignores it, the Texas Supreme Court evades it, 
and the lower state courts forthrightly find statutes ambiguous in order to 
accommodate both the rule and the highest courts’ objection to it.”327  
The situation in Connecticut involved the opposite ideological 
configuration, but nonetheless resulted in a similar judicial refusal to follow 
the rules of statutory interpretation that were codified by the legislature. This 
power struggle was initiated when the Connecticut Supreme Court announced 
in 2003 that it would no longer follow a plain meaning rule that precluded the 
consideration of extrinsic evidence of statutory meaning in the absence of 
textual ambiguity.328 In response to this decision, the state legislature promptly 
enacted a statute, which prohibits consideration of “extratextual evidence” of 
statutory meaning if the “text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield 
absurd or unworkable results.”329 Despite the state legislature’s rejection of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s eclectic approach, Professor Gluck reports that 
“the Connecticut Supreme Court has been very reluctant to apply the 
overruling statute.”330 After examining all of the relevant cases, Gluck found 
that “as long as the parties are arguing over statutory meaning, as litigating 
 
323 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2013) (“In construing a statute, whether or 
not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other 
matters the: (1) object sought to be attained . . . (3) legislative history . . . .”). 
324 See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  
325 Id. at 786 n.4 (quoting James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction when Legislation is 
Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 191, 211 n.85 (1966)). 
326 See Gluck, supra note 8, at 1789. 
327 Id. at 1790-91.  
328 See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 578 (Conn. 2003).  
329 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2003). 
330 Gluck, supra note 8, at 1794.  
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parties are likely to do, the Connecticut Supreme Court finds the text 
ambiguous and holds [the state interpretive code] inapplicable.”331 Moreover, 
she points out that because the court rarely finds the statute applicable, it has 
been able to avoid deciding “whether the statute unconstitutionally infringes on 
judicial authority, despite various hints in dicta that it might.”332 Gluck 
therefore correctly concludes that “Connecticut’s example underscores that 
resistance to legislated rules is not a textualist-only phenomenon,” and that the 
state judiciary’s approach “has meant that the legislated rule has had almost no 
practical effect.”333 While Texas and Connecticut may provide especially stark 
examples, Gluck and other scholars have found that state courts, as well as 
courts in other countries, frequently ignore codified rules of statutory 
interpretation, and the conventional wisdom is therefore that “courts will find 
ways around legislated methodological rules they do not like, and that judges 
may be unwilling to relinquish authority over interpretive methodology.”334 
Even if courts sincerely wanted to follow codified rules of statutory 
interpretation, they would have significant difficulty in doing so. 
Commentators have pointed out that the interpretive code must itself be 
interpreted, and codified rules of statutory interpretation will frequently be 
ambiguous about whether they apply to a particular case at hand.335 This “step 
zero” inquiry will necessarily turn on subsidiary questions that cannot be 
answered solely by reference to the interpretive code,336 such as (1) whether 
the interpretive code should be applied retroactively; (2) whether the 
interpretive code is intended to displace other widely accepted norms of 
statutory interpretation, especially when those norms are constitutionally 
motivated; (3) how courts should prioritize codified rules of statutory 
interpretation and other widely accepted interpretive principles; (4) what 
should be done if there are internal conflicts within an interpretive code; and 
(5) what should be done if there are conflicts between the results that would be 
generated by applying the interpretive code and the ascertainable intent of the 
legislature in a particular case. These kinds of questions necessarily recreate 
 
331 Id. at 1794-96.  
332 Id. at 1797.  
333 Id. 
334 Id. at 1786; see also id. at 1824-29 (describing this broader trend); Tutt, supra note 
269, at 2056-57 (recognizing that “often, these legislated interpretive rules fail,” and 
reporting that this is widely believed to be a result of judicial “reluctance, resistance, and 
evasion” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Widman, supra note 268, at 29 
(“Regardless of claim type, judge selection, or even the substance of the code construction 
acts, the courts did not consistently follow these legislative directives as ‘law,’ which makes 
sense institutionally.”). 
335 See Tutt, supra note 269, at 2059; Romero, supra note 46, at 228-47 (discussing 
“practical limitations on the impact of interpretive directions”).  
336 See Tutt, supra note 269, at 2057-58 (discussing “the impossibility of infinite regress” 
in this context).  
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judicial discretion, and they have a tendency to counsel in favor of the narrow 
application of codified rules of statutory interpretation. 
Andrew Tutt has therefore recently argued that “[t]his step zero problem 
ultimately means that binding interpretive methodologies are almost sure to 
unravel unless there is methodological consensus among past and future 
legislatures.”337 He illustrates this proposition by pointing out that courts could 
legitimately rely on the canon that the specific trumps the general to decline to 
apply interpretive codes when doing so would undermine the intent of the 
legislature that enacted the particular statute at issue.338 He also points out that 
courts routinely decline to apply interpretive code provisions that appear to 
abrogate the rule of lenity by “imputing to the legislature that enacted the 
lenity-repealing statute an intent to comply with the settled rule-of-law norms 
that animate the rule of lenity itself”—and concluding “that the legislature that 
repealed the rule of lenity could not have intended the repeal to apply to the 
facts of this particular case.”339 Because cases of this nature appear to thrust 
judges into an irreconcilable clash between the competing desires of two 
different legislatures, Tutt claims that criticizing courts for willfully 
disregarding codified rules of statutory interpretation is often unwarranted, and 
that “[j]udges who fail to heed interpretive rules are often among the 
legislature’s most faithful agents.”340 He therefore persuasively concludes that 
courts “may fail to implement binding methodological frameworks not because 
they won’t, but because they can’t.”341 
Finally, even if federal judges could consistently implement codified rules 
of statutory interpretation, I suspect that they probably wouldn’t. Because 
interpretive methodology is necessarily connected to judicial reasoning and the 
resolution of particular cases, courts are likely to disregard, ignore, or avoid 
provisions of interpretive codes that would otherwise compel them to reach 
decisions with which they strongly disagree, especially when courts believe 
that their preferred interpretations promote constitutional principles or other 
widely accepted public norms. For reasons explained above, courts can 
frequently justify such decisions by relying on the intent of the legislature that 
enacted the interpretive code (e.g., the code was not intended to apply to this 
case), or by relying on the intent of the legislature that enacted the statute at 
issue (e.g., applying the code to this case would undermine the intent of the 
legislature that enacted this statute, and the specific trumps the general), as 
well as by giving greater weight to judicially created norms (e.g., applying the 
 
337 Id. at 2057. 
338 See id. at 2059-61. 
339 Id. at 2064; see also Romero, supra note 46, at 230-31 (describing how some courts 
“will consider the rule of lenity and similar interpretive principles to take precedence over 
any legislative interpretive direction”). 
340 Tutt, supra note 269, at 2057. 
341 Id.  
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code to this case would raise serious constitutional difficulties that should be 
avoided). 
Moreover, unlike constitutional authority, most federal judges probably 
believe that the mandatory enforcement of codified rules of statutory 
interpretation would conflict with “the judicial power,”342 and, if push came to 
shove, they would probably hold many binding interpretive rules 
unconstitutional. This is unlikely to happen, however, because courts can 
typically avoid serious constitutional difficulties by ignoring, disregarding, or 
working around codified interpretive rules by using techniques like those 
described above. Indeed, they could explicitly invoke the avoidance canon to 
narrowly construe codified rules of statutory interpretation to avoid these more 
general constitutional concerns. The legal status of codified interpretive rules is 
therefore likely to remain ambiguous as a practical matter. In any event, the 
legislature cannot force the judiciary to follow codified rules of statutory 
interpretation, and in the absence of an established norm that such rules are 
legally binding, courts are likely to continue to disregard codified interpretive 
rules that would lead them to reach what they view as improper results. 
This does not mean that codified interpretive rules cannot play a worthwhile 
function. They do, after all, express the enacting legislature’s meta-intent, and 
the judiciary will often follow them when they do not conflict with a court’s 
assessment of the best resolution of a particular case. More important, by 
providing courts with meaningful guidance regarding the legislature’s 
interpretive preferences, codified rules of statutory interpretation provide 
relevant information that the judiciary should consider, even if the court 
ultimately declines to follow those directives in a particular case.343 
Accordingly, codified rules of statutory interpretation may provide a useful 
contribution to the ongoing, multi-institutional dialogue regarding how statutes 
should be interpreted in the modern regulatory state. 
B. Methodological Considerations 
For similar reasons, federal courts should treat prior methodological 
decisions with an appropriate degree of respect, but those decisions should 
only provide non-binding guidance for future cases. In a recent empirical study 
of the Supreme Court’s review of legal challenges to administrative agency 
interpretations of statutes, Bill Eskridge and Connor Raso have distinguished 
“precedent,” which provides formally binding rules that are applied predictably 
and systematically, from “canons,” which are applied episodically and reflect 
policies rather than precise legal rules.344 While most scholars believe that the 
Court’s deference doctrine functions as precedent, Eskridge and Raso 
demonstrate that the Court treats the principles underlying its prior deference 
 
342 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.  
343 See Romero, supra note 46, at 243-47 (endorsing such a conception of codified 
interpretive directions). 
344 See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 64, at 1734-35, 1765-66.  
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decisions more like canons, because “deference regimes operate mostly as 
presumptions or balancing factors evaluated by the Justices in combination 
with a variety of considerations.”345 Eskridge and Raso find that while 
“members of the Court sometimes seem to treat deference regimes (especially 
Chevron) as matters of stare decisis, the data establish that neither the Court 
nor any one of its Justices actually does so in the general run of cases.”346 In 
other words, none of the Justices follow the Court’s deference doctrine in a 
consistent and predictable way. Eskridge and Raso also claim that the 
canonical treatment of deference doctrine will almost certainly extend to other 
aspects of interpretive methodology because “statutory interpretation 
methodology does not seem susceptible to the rule-like approach of stare 
decisis”—it is fundamentally “a web of considerations with different and 
varying weights rather than a set of hierarchical rules.”347 Eskridge and Raso 
support this conclusion by pointing out that even the venerable “plain meaning 
rule” can be trumped by other considerations in sufficiently compelling 
circumstances,348 and by arguing that the application of stare decisis will not 
“stick” on issues of interpretive methodology, partly because reliance interests 
are weaker in this context and partly because courts will not let “form” dictate 
“substance.”349 Federal courts simply will not let methodological constraints 
lead them into making unreasonable legal or policy decisions, and this creates 
a need for continuing flexibility in deciding how to decide statutory cases. 
Similarly, Evan Criddle and I have recently argued that interpretive 
methodology is significantly different from substantive rules of law in several 
fundamental ways, and that it would be highly problematic for federal courts to 
attempt to freeze interpretive rules into place by applying stare decisis to prior 
methodological decisions.350 In this regard, substantive rules of law typically 
involve first-order rules of conduct (such as “no dogs allowed”), whereas 
interpretive methodology is composed primarily of second-order “rules about 
rules” (such as “interpret the statute by following the plain meaning of its 
text”), or even third-order “rules about rules about rules” (such as “defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory mandate”).351 
This severely complicates the prospect of giving stare decisis effect to 
interpretive methodology for several reasons. First, interpretive methodology 
involves higher stakes than substantive rules of law because interpretive rules 
are used to resolve disputes about the permissible scope of countless statutes in 
 
345 Id. at 1734-35.  
346 Id. at 1751. 
347 Id. at 1811. 
348 See id. at 1807 (discussing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
2504 (2009), which invoked the avoidance canon to reach a result that was unsupported by 
the statutory text).  
349 See id. at 1808-11, 1815-17.  
350 Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 36, at 1591-95. 
351 Id. at 1591. 
  
2015] DUMBING DOWN OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 269 
 
every policy area.352 Second, interpretive methodology has a significant 
influence on judicial reasoning and the decisions that are reached in cases of 
first impression.353 Any attempt to dictate a binding interpretive methodology 
could lead judges to reach outcomes with which they strongly disagree, and 
many judges will naturally and legitimately resist being forced into this type of 
“error.” Third, interpretive methodology is “frequently intertwined with a 
judge’s most fundamental beliefs about the rule of law and democracy,” and 
judges may understandably resist being forced to decide cases of first 
impression in a manner that conflicts with their understanding of the proper 
role of federal courts in a constitutional democracy.354 Fourth, the reliance 
interests that are served by the doctrine of stare decisis are typically weaker in 
the context of interpretive methodology than in the context of substantive 
law.355 Finally, “the flexibility that is provided by the current approach to 
statutory interpretation [in federal courts], and the broad range of arguments 
that are available to litigants and judges, provide affirmative benefits that 
improve the resolution of particular cases and make our legal system more 
responsive.”356 
While I also agree with the bulk of Eskridge and Raso’s analysis and 
conclusions, they seem to suggest that interpretive methodology cannot be 
given stare decisis effect because interpretive methodology resists such 
treatment, and their argument is therefore arguably circular.357 Indeed, 
Professor Gluck purports to have disproved this “impossibility thesis” by 
providing examples of state courts that have given interpretive regimes stare 
 
352 Id. at 1592. 
353 Id. at 1592-93. 
354 Id. at 1593. In an interesting twist on the debate over the value of proposals for 
methodological consensus, Maggie Lemos argues that interpretive methodology does not 
ordinarily dictate the outcomes in particular cases, but it does provide a seemingly neutral 
legal justification for more fundamental political views on the desirability of broader legal 
change. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 849 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15). While Lemos claims that 
“the political nature of methodological debates highlights the importance of consensus,” she 
is skeptical of the likelihood “that methodological consensus will ever emerge organically 
from the federal courts.” Id. at 904. She also suggests that efforts to treat methodology “as 
ordinary law” may be misguided because of the perceived stakes of the interpretive wars for 
the few judges who are committed to a particular methodology. See id. at 905-06. She 
concludes that by raising “the temperature on methodological debates that are already 
overheated,” proposals for methodological stare decisis “may do more harm than good to 
the rule-of-law values of notice and predictability that the doctrine of stare decisis is 
designed to promote.” Id. at 906.  
355 Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 36, at 1593-94. 
356 Id. at 1594-95; see also Leib & Serota, supra note 31, at 49, 53-58, 61-62.  
357 See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 64, at 1811 (claiming that “statutory interpretation 
methodology does not seem susceptible to the rule-like approach of stare decisis”). 
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decisis effect.358 Although those interpretive regimes have not been in place for 
long, and it is not clear that they will “stick” when the ideological composition 
of those courts changes,359 the disparity in treatment raises interesting 
questions about the institutional and cultural differences between state and 
federal courts. In any event, it seems clear that federal courts currently refuse 
to give stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology, and that whether they 
should continue to do so is largely a normative question. Eskridge and Raso 
acknowledge that “norms matter” in thinking about the legal status of 
interpretive methodology,360 and I would contend that federal courts should 
continue to treat interpretive methodology in a canonical fashion because 
doing so promotes all of the norms articulated in the previous Part of this 
Article. In particular, the current treatment of interpretive methodology 
recognizes the importance of avoiding the possibility of arbitrary domination, 
facilitates practical reasoning and the respectful treatment of diverse 
perspectives in interpretive litigation, allows statutory interpretation to be 
influenced by a wide range of public values without being unduly constrained 
by fixed legal norms, and allows statutory interpretation to function as a 
mechanism of contestatory democracy. In short, the current treatment of 
interpretive methodology creates a more responsive system of law, and thereby 
promotes freedom and democracy. 
C. Percolation in the Lower Courts 
So, federal courts are not required to follow codified rules of statutory 
interpretation, and interpretive methodology should not be given stare decisis 
effect, but shouldn’t we at least encourage lower courts to follow a simpler 
approach to statutory interpretation than the U.S. Supreme Court? The 
normative perspective developed in Part III suggests not. Professor Bruhl 
builds his case for “hierarchical heterogeneity” in statutory interpretation on 
the hierarchical nature of the judicial process, the disparities in technical 
capacity and resources among different levels of courts, and differences in 
methods of judicial selection.361 None of these differences justify restrictions 
 
358 Gluck, supra note 8, at 1772. 
359 Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court has recently modified its interpretive framework, 
see State v. Gaine, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050 (Or. 2009) (“[W]e no longer will require an 
ambiguity in the text of a statute as a necessary predicate to the second step—consideration 
of pertinent legislative history that a party may proffer.”), and the Michigan Supreme Court 
has reversed its position on the absurdity doctrine, see Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 
718 N.W.2d 784, 790-91 (Mich. 2006) (claiming that the absurdity doctrine was not 
implicated because there were numerous explanations for “why the Legislature could have 
intended the result the plain language of the statute requires”); Gluck, supra note 8, at 1807 
(pointing to the four-justice majority who thought the rule against absurdities should be 
reinstated and who “argue[d] for the overruling of a precedent, not merely a change in 
nonbinding judicial philosophy”).  
360 See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 64, at 1816-17.  
361 See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.  
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on the judiciary’s authority to consider information that is relevant to the best 
resolution of any particular case. On the contrary, the adoption of lower 
standards for lower courts would inhibit the capacity of statutory interpretation 
to function as a mechanism of contestatory democracy, and would therefore 
undermine the central point of the enterprise. 
As Bruhl points out, there is little doubt that lower court decisions are 
generally less visible than decisions of the Supreme Court, and that relevant 
information about the best resolution of a case is sometimes generated as a 
case moves up the appellate ladder.362 Moreover, lower court decisions can 
certainly have an impact on the workload of higher courts, particularly when 
lower courts invalidate the work of legislatures or agencies or render decisions 
that create circuit splits.363 While one reaction to these institutional realities 
would be to encourage lower courts to tread lightly and to try to avoid reaching 
decisions that rock the boat, the better view from my perspective is to 
recognize that lower courts are part of a broader legal process that is designed 
to facilitate reasoned deliberation about legal and policy issues by many actors 
in a variety of institutional contexts.364 Thus, if lower courts invalidate statutes 
on constitutional grounds, deviate from a straightforward reading of statutory 
text to avoid constitutional doubts or absurd results, or invalidate agency action 
as arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law, those decisions should ordinarily 
be reviewed by a higher court. The institutional advantages of higher courts 
simply mean that they are well-situated to provide a second opinion and 
perform this reviewing function. Even if those decisions are not appealed, 
perhaps because the federal government wants to avoid creating adverse 
precedent, such decisions will typically generate further deliberation and 
activity within the executive branch and potentially within the legislature. 
While lower court decisions are less likely to capture the attention of Congress 
than higher court decisions, lower court decisions of the foregoing nature are 
specifically designed to promote constitutional norms and other public values. 
Those lower court decisions thereby protect individuals or groups from the 
possibility of arbitrary domination by the state, unless or until public officials 
with greater authority over the matter engage in focused deliberation on the 
precise questions at issue.  
This type of focused dialogue is most likely to occur when a court reaches a 
decision that differs from the stable equilibrium established by legislatures, 
agencies, and other courts, and while lower courts should not be provocative 
without good reason, they should not hesitate to disagree with other public 
officials or create circuit splits on issues that generate reasonable differences of 
 
362 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 459-65. 
363 See id. at 465-69. 
364 See Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a 
Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 487-88 (2012) (explaining that 
percolation promotes deliberation between and among governmental institutions and 
thereby promotes core democratic values). 
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opinion. This is precisely how important legal and policy issues “percolate” 
within the federal judicial system,365 and why the Supreme Court can 
ultimately resolve hard cases in a reasoned fashion with the benefit of the 
broad range of views and perspectives that were expressed or developed while 
the issue was working its way up the judicial ladder.366 Of course, if lower 
courts agree with the government’s position, the opportunity for contestatory 
democracy still improves the democratic legitimacy of the state’s exercise of 
authority,367 and the losing party remains free to seek appellate review of that 
decision. There is, however, no reason to artificially restrict the nature of the 
interpretive arguments that can be presented by the parties, or relied upon by 
the courts, during the early stages of the legal process. 
Higher courts may sometimes have resource advantages that allow them to 
give more careful consideration to a wider range of relevant information, but 
that does not mean that lower courts should be precluded from considering 
relevant information when it is available to them. Moreover, the resource 
limitations of lower courts are certainly not a valid reason for precluding the 
parties from presenting relevant information or arguments about the best 
resolution of a case in their briefs. Professors Bruhl and Vermeule both seem 
to overstate the difficulties faced by courts that are willing to consider eclectic 
sources of information and engage in practical reasoning, because they 
virtually ignore the role that the parties play in litigation. Lower courts, in 
particular, do not interpret statutes on a “blank slate,” by conducting 
independent research from scratch on every potentially relevant line of inquiry. 
Rather, they rely primarily on the briefs and arguments of the parties to reach a 
decision about the best resolution of the case, and they write an opinion based 
largely on that information. While courts almost certainly conduct independent 
research to verify or supplement the information that is provided by the parties, 
they are also expected to be responsive to the arguments of the parties under 
traditional theories of adjudication.368 The traditional role of a judge in 
adjudication is entirely compatible with an understanding of statutory 
 
365 See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699 & n.68 (1984). 
366 From this perspective, higher courts should generally treat the decisions of lower 
courts with respect, and higher courts should feel free to rely on those decisions when they 
are persuasive. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 851 (2014) (examining the role of lower court precedent in the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making).  
367 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On 
the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1053 
(2014) (“The system places a premium on disparate decision-makers all reaching the same 
conclusion—when this occurs, the decision enjoys both great formal scope of application 
and legitimacy.”). 
368 See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the 
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 137-60 (2005) (discussing the expected role of courts 
under traditional models of adjudication). 
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interpretation as contestatory democracy—where the function of interpretive 
litigation is to give individuals or groups an opportunity to challenge the 
validity of governmental authority. It would therefore be fundamentally 
illegitimate for courts systematically to disregard or ignore the views or 
perspectives of the parties in reaching their decisions. 
The disconnect between these proposals to dumb down statutory 
interpretation and the actual nature of interpretive litigation is magnified in the 
modern regulatory state, where agencies are frequently parties, and the federal 
government is typically represented by the Department of Justice. The Justice 
Department is a repeat player in interpretive litigation involving major 
regulatory statutes, and it does not need to reinvent the wheel or conduct 
research from scratch in most of its cases. Rather, it can compile the complete 
legislative and regulatory histories of those statutes, along with any other 
information that would generally be relevant in interpretive litigation. I know 
from personal experience that lawyers representing the federal government in 
interpretive litigation in federal district court can walk over to “main Justice” 
to read the collected legislative history of major regulatory statutes before 
writing their briefs on many interpretive issues. Of course, regulatory agencies 
also have the resources and incentives to compile similar information on all of 
the major statutes they implement. The point is that economies of scale 
encourage the federal government to compile the type of information that is 
needed to interpret regulatory statutes in a pragmatic fashion. As a result, 
Justice Department briefs routinely provide the court with a detailed “statutory 
background” and “regulatory background” before addressing the precise 
questions at issue in the case. The court will therefore frequently have this 
information (as well as the relevant citations) as a matter of course in cases that 
require the interpretation of regulatory statutes, without exerting any time or 
effort beyond reading the briefs.369 
 
369 My personal experience and intuition regarding the relative ease with which the 
federal government can brief the legislative history of a statute is strongly supported by 
Nicholas Parrillo’s recent study of the rise of legislative history in federal courts. Parrillo 
finds that the use of legislative history almost suddenly became routine around 1940 as a 
result of the work of the newly expanded New Deal regulatory state, which “was the first 
institution in American history capable of systematically researching and briefing legislative 
discourse and rendering it tractable and legible to judges on a wholesale basis.” Nicholas R. 
Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and 
the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 266 (2013); see also 
Eskridge, supra note 233, at 425 (“I have read all the briefs filed by the Solicitor General 
supporting an agency interpretation in hundreds of Supreme Court cases between 1984 and 
2006. Upon reading these cases, my judgment is that the agency briefs were, virtually 
without exception, most useful discussions of legislative history, and that executive 
department lawyers were skilled and relatively scrupulous in discovering and analyzing 
legislative history.”). In any event, my primary point is that one cannot properly assess the 
costs associated with competing methods of statutory interpretation without considering the 
role of the parties.  
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This insight suggests that we should worry less about the resource 
disparities between different levels of federal courts and more about the 
resource disparities that often exist between the parties. When one party has 
better access to information than her opponent, and the party with greater 
resources has potential incentives to present selective information to the court, 
there is a danger that the court could be swayed to reach a decision that differs 
from the choice that would be made with full information. Moreover, this 
problem is less likely to occur at higher levels of the federal judiciary because 
cases that are pursued on appeal tend to have more resources devoted to 
them.370 While resource disparities pose serious problems for many aspects of 
litigation,371 the ubiquity of the problem does not mean that we should not be 
concerned about its potentially negative impact on statutory interpretation. 
There are a couple of reasons to believe, however, that the problem may be 
less significant in this context than in many others. First, the Justice 
Department has an ethical duty of candor, and while the government usually 
has no obligation to help the opposing party put its best foot forward, it cannot 
affirmatively mislead the court either.372 Second, the parties who challenge the 
government’s understanding of regulatory statutes by seeking judicial review 
of administrative action are frequently well-financed regulated entities.373 The 
opposing party therefore frequently has more resources at its disposal than the 
lawyers who are representing the federal government. Indeed, the propensity of 
regulated entities to seek judicial review of agency action is widely believed to 
have contributed to the ossification of informal rulemaking by administrative 
agencies, in a closely related context.374 
Resource disparities between parties also pose a significantly less daunting 
problem if we return to thinking about statutory interpretation as contestatory 
democracy from a systemic perspective. Contestatory democracy is largely 
about providing individuals or groups with meaningful opportunities to be 
heard. We should therefore not preclude those individuals or groups from 
providing the information and arguments they find most persuasive. They 
should also be able to devote whatever resources they can to put their best feet 
forward. If resource constraints limit the quality of their briefing, that is 
unfortunate, but it does not change the fact that they have had an opportunity to 
 
370 See Bruhl, supra note 13, at 470-73. 
371 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  
372 See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that government lawyers owed the court a general duty of candor). 
373 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1314-18 (1998) (describing “structural biases” of litigation and 
claiming that challenges to regulation “are overwhelmingly” brought by regulated entities). 
374 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
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challenge the legality of public authority. Moreover, they can pursue an appeal 
if they have the will and the way, and the case may come out differently in 
another judicial forum. The creation of a split within the lower courts would, in 
turn, likely facilitate the type of dialogue described above, and potentially 
result in an eventual Supreme Court decision on the issue. If that were to 
occur, the full range of interests and perspectives would likely be presented to 
the Court by the parties and a host of amici, who would all have had the 
opportunity to learn from the deliberations that already occurred in the lower 
courts.375 
In any event, Professors Bruhl and Vermeule both recommend resolving 
ambiguities in the surface meaning of statutory text by deferring to the views of 
administrative agencies, and Bruhl claims that lower courts should be even 
more deferential than higher courts.376 This recommendation is unlikely to 
alleviate the resource disparities that sometimes exist between the Justice 
Department and its adversaries in litigation. Moreover, if lower federal courts 
declined to provide meaningful review of the quality of an agency’s reasoning, 
they would also be depriving the people who are challenging the exercise of 
public authority of an opportunity for contestatory democracy, and they would 
thereby be undermining the central function of statutory interpretation in the 
modern regulatory state, especially if such decisions are not appealed. The 
proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation are so heavily focused on 
finding the cheapest and easiest way to ascertain the meaning of the law, that 
they forget that the underlying lawsuits are typically brought to challenge the 
validity of agency action. 
Should a judge’s method of selection influence her interpretive 
methodology? This is an interesting and complicated question, but for present 
purposes a simple “probably not” should suffice. This answer is partly a 
function of my sense that the political accountability of elected judges is 
generally weak and potentially problematic, and that courts can be held 
deliberatively accountable by giving reasons for their decisions.377 This answer 
is also partly a function of my view that courts should engage in practical 
reasoning when they interpret statutes, and that they should therefore make 
decisions that reflect their understanding of the best answer on the merits under 
the circumstances. My sense is that although federal judges with life tenure 
may be better situated to achieve this ideal based on their relative insulation 
 
375 See Krotoszynski, supra note 367, at 1082-83 (recognizing that the structure of the 
federal judicial system “greatly enhances process values and diffuses judicial power in a 
way that advances deliberation, reason-giving, and consistency among and between courts,” 
and claiming that “before we embrace efforts to promote higher levels of uniformity, to be 
achieved more quickly and more reliably, we should not fail to appreciate some of the 
deliberative benefits of the current system”). 
376 Bruhl, supra note 13, at 494-95; see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically 
Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (2013). 
377 Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253 (2009). 
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from political pressure, it is an ideal to which all judges should aspire, 
regardless of their method of appointment or removal. 
D. The Fatal Flaws of the New Textualisms 
My proposed vision of statutory interpretation as a mechanism of 
contestatory democracy helps to illuminate the most fundamental problems 
with textualism.378 Simply put, the function of statutory interpretation in the 
modern regulatory state is not simply to ascertain the meaning of the law, but 
rather to provide the people with opportunities to contest the validity of 
governmental action. While the semantic meaning of the statutory text is 
always important, and perhaps frequently dispositive, courts should also 
consider a variety of other information before making a final decision in most 
statutory cases. By considering the interests and perspectives of individuals or 
groups who stand to be adversely affected by the application of governmental 
authority, and by assessing and responding to their arguments in a reasoned 
fashion, the judiciary can limit the potential for arbitrary domination by the 
state and thereby promote democracy. 
In contrast, textualism’s dogmatic focus on ascertaining “what the law as 
enacted meant” is fundamentally misguided because it eliminates the 
contestatory dimension of statutory interpretation. This is a product of 
textualism’s proclaimed effort to preclude courts from openly considering the 
policy consequences of their decisions, and it is operationalized by insisting 
that statutory meaning is fixed when the law is enacted and related efforts to 
limit the scope of statutory ambiguity. Textualism further erodes the 
contestatory dimension of statutory interpretation by privileging historical 
linguistic analysis and a statute’s semantic context over the enacting 
legislature’s policy goals and other contemporary public norms when 
attributing meaning to a statute. This problem is significantly compounded, 
moreover, when courts purport to rely on artificial decision-making 
frameworks to ascertain the meaning of the law or refuse to conduct 
meaningful review of administrative action.  
If the function of statutory interpretation is to provide the people with 
opportunities to challenge the validity of governmental authority, it would be 
particularly problematic for courts to defer to any “permissible” resolution of a 
statutory ambiguity by an administrative agency, irrespective of whether the 
agency engaged in reasoned decision-making under the circumstances. Rather, 
courts should sustain challenges to the validity of agency action unless 
Congress explicitly resolved the precise question at issue in accordance with 
the agency’s decision, or the agency adequately considered the competing 
interests and perspectives and reached a reasoned decision on how to 
implement an ambiguous statute in light of the available information. 
Otherwise, the people could be harmed by the state as a result of semantics or 
 
378 See Staszewski, supra note 27, at 295-99.  
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interest group politics, without any governmental institution making a reasoned 
determination that such treatment would advance the public interest. 
Courts that follow a strict textualist methodology will therefore be prone to 
making democratically illegitimate decisions. This is hardly surprising, 
however, since new texualist theorists have an impoverished view of the 
requirements of democratic legitimacy, and tend to disregard the potential role 
of courts in improving democracy. The vision of statutory interpretation as 
contestatory democracy charges courts with the obligation to listen to the 
interests and perspectives of individuals and groups whose voices were not 
heard in the legislative or administrative processes, and to reach decisions that 
are responsive to their legitimate concerns. The federal judiciary can therefore 
protect the people from the possibility of arbitrary domination by the state. 
Professor Vermeule would apparently discount these potential benefits as 
speculative, and focus instead on limiting the costs of statutory interpretation 
and minimizing the possibility of judicial mistakes.379 Meanwhile, Justice 
Scalia contends that “‘one of the chief functions of our courts is to act as an 
animated and authoritative dictionary.’”380 While buying and using a 
dictionary may be cheaper and easier than protecting the people from the 
possibility of arbitrary domination by the state, this approach does nothing to 
promote freedom in our society, and it therefore misses the entire point of 
statutory interpretation in a republican democracy. 
E. Institutional Dialogues 
This Part has provided reasons to doubt that statutory interpretation can or 
should be made substantially simpler or more predictable. If this thesis is 
correct, the prospects for establishing an interpretive regime that would allow 
Congress to better predict how its statutes will be implemented in hard cases 
are not very good. This is not a problem from the standpoint of contestatory 
democracy. Contrary to the view of the advocates of dumbing down statutory 
interpretation, there is already an interpretive regime that provides sufficient 
guidance to Congress regarding how its work is likely to be interpreted. Most 
important, Congress knows that when it has explicitly resolved a specific 
policy issue in a reasoned fashion during the lawmaking process, agencies and 
courts are obligated to respect that decision based on the principle of 
legislative supremacy. When a statute is ambiguous regarding the precise 
question at issue, however, Congress knows that agencies will typically 
implement their own views of the best course of action on the merits under the 
circumstances, and that courts will review those decisions for a reasoned 
explanation. Because different courts may have different views of the validity 
of agency action, and because Congress could amend a statute definitively to 
resolve the matter (or administrative agencies could change their minds), the 
 
379 See supra Part I.D. 
380 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 415 (quoting LORD MACMILLAN, LAW AND 
OTHER THINGS 163 (1938)). 
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entire process is best understood as an ongoing, multi-dimensional institutional 
dialogue.381 Provisional dialogues by and among different centers of power 
better reflect the nature of law in the modern regulatory state than artificial 
efforts to achieve simple, predictable, and uniform final answers to our most 
pressing legal or social problems. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has aimed to dampen the recent enthusiasm for making 
statutory interpretation simpler and more uniform. After describing several 
prominent theories or proposals that exemplify this trend, the Article explained 
that they are essentially driven by a perceived need to constrain judicial 
discretion, a desire to make interpretive methodology more rule-oriented, a 
belief that the traditional hierarchy of legal sources is exclusive, and an 
assumption that statutory interpretation’s function is to ascertain the meaning 
of the law. Because these beliefs and assumptions are not unusual, the 
proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation could very easily continue to 
gain adherents. Yet, many knowledgeable commentators and judges may be 
uncomfortable with the idea of adopting a uniform and binding set of relatively 
mechanical rules of statutory interpretation, even if it is difficult to pinpoint the 
precise reasons for this discomfort. 
This Article has attempted to explain this discomfort by challenging each of 
the foregoing assumptions. In particular, it has emphasized the importance of 
avoiding the possibility of arbitrary domination by the state and a belief in the 
value of practical reasoning and diverse perspectives within the interpretive 
enterprise. It has also proposed a new hierarchy of law for the modern 
regulatory state, and argued that the function of statutory interpretation in our 
contemporary system of governance is to provide citizens with opportunities to 
challenge the validity of governmental action. From this perspective, the 
proposals to dumb down statutory interpretation are fundamentally misguided, 
and there are serious limitations on the extent to which statutory interpretation 
methodology can or should be simple or uniform. Finally, the Article has 
sought to show that a relatively ambitious judicial role in statutory 
interpretation promotes a normatively attractive view of democracy and the 
rule of law, and that it is ultimately the more traditional faithful agent theories, 
and particularly the new textualism, that suffers from a democratic deficit. 
 
 
381 Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16 (proposing a theory of law as the equilibrium 
that results from a balance among competing forces and institutions).  
